Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms

Abstract

Examines how the benefits to managers of corporate control affect the relationship between managerial ownership and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Examination of mergers between 1985 and 1991; Characteristics of agency costs to equity in various levels of managerial ownership.

Authors: R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia

Format: Journal Article

Publication Date: January 1, 1995

Journal: RAND Journal of Economics

Full Citation

Hubbard, R. Glenn and Darius Palia. “Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms.”

RAND Journal of Economics

vol. 26, (January 01, 1995): 782-92.

Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms

Abstract

Full Citation

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