Abstract
In the Dueling Experts Game, adversarial experts strategically produce 'good' and fabricate 'bad' evidence in support of their partisan claims. Good evidence is probative while bad evidence has no evidentiary value. The new feature of this Game is that Judge sometimes erroneously identifies good evidence as bad evidence and vice versa. Along the Game's equilibrium path, each partisan expert produces only good evidence if it supports his side. When favorable good evidence is unavailable, a partisan expert manufactures bad evidence to support his claim. Hence, dueling experts always contradict one another. Despite their conflicting testimony, one of the experts invariably produces the available good evidence for Judge. Therefore, Judge always receives the available good evidence. While the equilibrium verdict depends on the quality of evidence produced, surprisingly, the quality of the testifying experts does not matter.
Full Citation
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“Dueling Experts, Evidence Production, and Imperfect Verification.”
International Review of Law and Economics.
Forthcoming.