Social Networks, Reputation, and Commitment: Evidence from a Savings Monitors Experiment

We study whether individuals save more when information about their savings is shared with another village member (a “monitor”). We focus on whether the monitor’s effectiveness depends on her network position. Central monitors may be better able to disseminate information, and more proximate monitors may pass information to individuals who interact with the saver frequently. In 30 villages, we randomly assign monitors. Average monitors increase savings by 35%. A one-standard deviation more central monitor increases savings by 14%; increasing proximity from social distance three to two increases savings by 16%. The increased savings persist over a year after the intervention’s end, and monitored savers better respond to shocks. In 30 other villages, savers choose their monitors. Proximate and central monitors are chosen. Information flows. 63% of monitors tell others about the saver’s progress. 15 months later, others know more about the saver’s progress and believe she is responsible if the saver was assigned a more central monitor.