Abstract
In this paper, we ask, will preferential agreement undermine a multilateral trading system that is built on the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination? A remaining question is then, how do preferential agreements affect the enforcement provisions of the GATT? To lay the foundation for an answer to the first question, we describe a framework within which the pillar of reciprocity and non-discrimination can themselves be interpreted and understood. From this perspective we then offer support for the view that preferential agreements pose a threat to the multilateral system. An answer to the second question requires an understanding of how GATT agreements are enforced. Observing that these agreement must be self-enforcing, we describe circumstances under which preferential agreements can either enhance or detract from the performance of the GATT system through their impacts on enforcement at the multilateral level.
Full Citation
Staiger, Robert. “Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?”
Economic Journal
vol. 108,
(July 01, 1998): 1162-82.