

Monetary policy in a data-rich environment[☆]

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Abstract

Most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been confined to frameworks in which the Federal Reserve is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount of information, despite the fact that the Fed actively monitors literally thousands of economic time series. This article explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information sets into the analysis, both positive and normative, of Fed policymaking. We employ a factor-model approach, developed by Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W., Diffusion Indices, *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 2002, 20 (2) 147, Forecasting Inflation, 1999, *Journal of Monetary Economics* 44 (2) 293, that permits the systematic information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few estimated factors. With this framework, we reconfirm Stock and Watson's result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy, and we show that this result does not seem to depend on the use of finally revised (as opposed to "real-time") data. We estimate policy reaction functions for the Fed that take into account its data-rich environment and provide a test of the hypothesis that Fed actions are explained solely by its forecasts of inflation and real activity. Finally, we explore the possibility of developing an "expert system" that could aggregate diverse information and provide benchmark policy settings.

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1. Introduction

Monetary policy-makers are inundated by economic data. Research departments throughout the Federal Reserve System, as in other central banks, monitor and analyze literally thousands of data series from disparate sources, including data at a wide range of frequencies and levels of aggregation, with and without seasonal and other adjustments, and in preliminary, revised, and “finally revised” versions. Nor is exhaustive data analysis performed only by professionals employed in part for that purpose; observers of Alan Greenspan’s chairmanship, for example, have emphasized his own meticulous attention to a wide variety of data series ([Beckner, 1996](#)).

The very fact that central banks bear the costs of analyzing a wide range of data series suggests that policy-makers view these activities as relevant to their decisions. Indeed, recent econometric analyses have confirmed the longstanding view of professional forecasters, that the use of large number of data series may significantly improve forecasts of key macroeconomic variables ([Stock and Watson, 1999, 2002](#); [Watson, 2000](#)). Central bankers’ reputations as data fiends may also reflect motivations other than minimizing average forecast errors, including multiple and shifting policy objectives, uncertainty about the correct model of the economy, and the central bank’s political need to demonstrate that it is taking all potentially relevant factors into account.¹

Despite this reality of central bank practice, most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been confined to frameworks in which the Fed is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount of information. For example, the well-known vector autoregression (VAR) methodology, used in many recent attempts to characterize the determinants and effects of monetary policy, generally limits the analysis to eight macroeconomic time series or fewer.² Small models have many advantages, including most obviously simplicity and tractability. However, we believe that this divide between central bank practice and most formal models of the Fed reflects at least in part researchers’ difficulties in capturing the central banker’s approach to data analysis, which typically mixes the use of large macroeconomic models, smaller statistical models (such as VARs), heuristic and judgmental analyses, and informal weighting of information from diverse sources. This disconnect between central bank practice and academic analysis has, potentially, several costs: First, by ignoring an important dimension of central bank behavior and the policy environment, econometric modeling and evaluation of central bank policies may be less accurate and informative than it otherwise would be. Second, researchers may be foregoing the opportunity to help central bankers use their extensive data sets to

¹A related motivation, consistent with the approach of our paper, is that the Fed thinks of concepts like “economic activity” as being latent variables in a large system. Such a viewpoint would be consistent with classical Burns and Mitchell business cycle analysis. See also the latent variable approach to business cycle modeling of [Stock and Watson \(1989\)](#).

²See [Christiano et al. \(2000\)](#) for a survey of the monetary VAR literature. [Leeper et al. \(1996\)](#) are able to increase the number of variables analyzed through the use of Bayesian priors, but their VAR systems still typically contain fewer than 20 variables.

improve their forecasting and policymaking. It thus seems worthwhile for analysts to try to take into account the fact that in practice monetary policy is made in a “data-rich environment”.

This paper is an exploratory study of the feasibility of incorporating richer information sets into the analysis, both positive and normative, of Federal Reserve policy-making. Methodologically, we are motivated by the aforementioned work of Stock and Watson. Following earlier work on dynamic factor models,³ Stock and Watson have developed dimension reduction schemes, akin to traditional principal components analysis, that extract key forecasting information from “large” data sets (i.e., data sets for which the number of data series may approach or exceed the number of observations per series). They show, in simulated forecasting exercises, that their methods offer potentially large improvements in the forecasts of macroeconomic time series, such as inflation. From our perspective, the Stock–Watson methodology has several additional advantages: First, it is flexible, in the sense that it can potentially accommodate data of different vintages, at different frequencies, and of different spans, thus replicating the use of multiple data sources by central banks. Second, their methodology offers a data-analytic framework that is clearly specified and statistically rigorous but remains agnostic about the structure of the economy. Finally, although we do not take advantage of this feature here, their method can be combined with more structural approaches to improve forecasting still further (Stock and Watson, 1999).

The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 extends the research of Stock and Watson by further investigating the value of their methods in forecasting measures of inflation and real activity (and, by extension, the value of those forecasts as proxies for central bank expectations). We consider three alternative data sets: first, a “real-time” data set, in which the data correspond closely to what was actually observable by the Fed when it made its forecasts; second, a data set containing the same time series as the first but including only finally revised data; and third, a much larger, and revised, data set based on that employed by Stock and Watson (2002). We compare forecasts from these three data sets with each other and with historical Federal Reserve forecasts, as reported in the Greenbook. We find, in brief, that the scope of the data set (the number and variety of series included) matters very much for forecasting performance, while the use of revised (as opposed to real-time) data seems to matter much less. We also find that “combination” forecasts, which give equal weight to our statistical forecasts and Greenbook forecasts, can sometimes outperform Greenbook forecasts alone.

In Section 3 we apply the Stock–Watson methodology to conduct a positive analysis of Federal Reserve behavior. Specifically, we estimate monetary policy reaction functions, or PRFs, which relate the Fed’s instrument (in this article, the fed funds rate) to the state of the economy, as determined by the full information set. Our interest is in testing formally whether the Fed’s reactions to the state of the

³Sargent and Sims (1977) is an important early reference. See also Quah and Sargent (1993), Forni and Reichlin (1996), and Forni et al. (2000) for related approaches. Knox et al. (2000) describes a related shrinkage estimator.

economy can be accurately summarized by a forward-looking Taylor rule of the sort studied by [Battini and Haldane \(1999\)](#) and [Clarida et al. \(1999, 2000\)](#), among others; or whether, as is sometimes alleged, the Fed responds to variables other than expected real activity and expected inflation. We show here that application of the Stock–Watson methodology to this problem provides both a natural specification test for the standard forward-looking PRF, as well as a nonparametric method for studying sources of misspecification.

Section 4 briefly considers whether the methods employed in this paper might not eventually prove useful to the Fed in actual policy-making. In particular, one can imagine an “expert system” that receives data in real time and provides a consistent benchmark estimate of the implied policy setting. To assess this possibility, we conduct a counterfactual historical exercise, in which we ask how well monetary policy would have done if it had relied mechanically on SW forecasts and some simple policy reaction functions. Perhaps not surprisingly, though our expert system performs creditably, it does not match the record of human policy-makers. Nevertheless, the exercise provides some interesting results, including the finding that the inclusion of estimated factors in dynamic models of monetary policy can mitigate the well-known “price puzzle”, the common finding that changes in monetary policy seem to have perverse effects on inflation. Section 5 concludes by discussing possible extensions of this research.

2. Forecasting in a data-rich environment: some further results

[Stock and Watson \(1999a, b\)](#), henceforth SW, have shown that dynamic factor methods applied to large data sets can lead to improved forecasts of key macroeconomic variables, at least in simulated forecasting exercises. In this section we investigate three issues relevant to the applications we have in mind. First, we seek to determine whether the SW results are sensitive to the use of “real-time”, rather than finally revised data. Second, we ask whether data sets containing many time series forecast appreciably better than data sets with fewer series. Finally, we compare simulated forecasts using SW methods applied to alternative data sets to historical Fed forecasts, as published in the Greenbook.

We first briefly review the SW method and our implementation of it. Following [SW \(2002\)](#), to which the reader is referred for details, we assume that at date t the forecaster has available a large number of time series, collectively denoted X_t . Again, by “large” we mean to allow for the possibility that the number of time series approaches or even exceeds the number of observations per series. Let w_t be a scalar time series, say inflation, which we would like to forecast. Both X_t and w_t are transformed to be stationary, and for notational simplicity we assume also that each series is mean-zero. Assume that (X_t, w_{t+1}) have an approximate dynamic factor model representation:

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= \Lambda F_t + e_t, \\ w_{t+1} &= \beta F_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In (1) the F_t are (a relatively small number of) unobserved factors that summarize the systematic information in the data set. Λ is the factor-loading matrix, and β is a row-vector of parameters that relates the variable to be forecasted to the current realizations of the factors.⁴ In a macroeconomic context (1) might be motivated by standard dynamic general equilibrium models of the economy, in which the reduced form expressions for the exogenous and endogenous variables are linear combinations of a few fundamental shocks (the factors). Note that F_t may contain lagged values of the underlying factors; this is the sense in which this model is “dynamic”. The idiosyncratic error terms e_t may be weakly correlated, in a sense described by SW. We assume $E(e_{t+1}|F_t) = 0$.

SW (2002) show that the factors in a model of the form (1) can be consistently estimated by principal components analysis, when the time series dimension (T) and the cross-section dimension (N) both go to infinity. The estimated factor model (1) can then be used in the obvious way to forecast the series w_t . We note, though, that the efficiency properties of the SW estimator are still unknown, so that this approach offers no guidance on how optimally to weight variables X_t for estimation and forecasting. This is an important topic for future research.

A useful feature of the SW framework, as implemented by an EM algorithm, is that it permits one to deal systematically with data irregularities (SW, 2002, Appendix A). In particular, our implementation of the SW approach allows the collection of time series X to include both monthly and quarterly series, series that are introduced mid-sample or are discontinued, and series with missing values. The fact that at each date the Fed may be looking at a different vintage (revision) of a given underlying data series is also incorporated automatically in our implementation.

In the next section we consider forward-looking policy reaction functions under which the Fed is assumed to respond to its forecasts of inflation and real activity. Accordingly, we focus in this section on forecasting CPI inflation and two measures of economic activity, the unemployment rate and industrial production. The principal results reported below are based on three alternative data sets: a “real-time” data set, a data set containing the same variables as the first but in finally revised form, and the finally revised data set employed by SW (2002). We describe each of these data sets very briefly; for more details, see the on-line appendix available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~jb903> or in the working-paper version of this article.

2.1. Real-time data set

A realistic description of Fed behavior requires recognition not only of the central bank’s data-rich environment, as we have emphasized so far, but also of the fact that the Fed observes the economy in “real time”. That is, the economic data actually

⁴Although we have not allowed explicitly for time variation in the parameters, SW (2002) show that, even in the presence of modest parameter drift or large jumps caused by data irregularities, the factors are consistently estimated by the principal component procedure used in this paper.

available to the Fed in a particular month may differ significantly from the finally revised version of the same data, available only for retrospective analysis. Indeed, recent research has shown that the common practice of using finally revised rather than real-time data in empirical studies is often not innocuous. For example, [Orphanides \(2001\)](#) shows that the description of the historical conduct of monetary policy provided by a standard Taylor rule is much less convincing when estimated using real-time data.

To get a sense of the importance of this issue in our context, we created a composite real-time data set, consisting of the union of the real-time data sets constructed by [Croushore and Stark \(2002\)](#) and by [Ghysels et al. \(1998\)](#), with modest updating.⁵ These two data sets include series on GDP and its components, aggregate price measures, and monetary aggregates and components. To these we added a variety of financial indicators (stock price indices, interest rates, and exchange rates), which can safely be assumed both to be known immediately and not to be revised. Finally, as the CPI and PPI are rarely revised, except for rebasing when the base year is changed, we included sub-components of these two indices in the data set.⁶ The complete real-time data set used here includes 78 data series, of both monthly and quarterly frequency. We include data from January 1959 onward if available, otherwise from the earliest date available for each series.

2.2. *Fully revised data set*

To determine the importance of the real-time nature of our first data set, we also replicated all our results using what we call, loosely, the “fully revised” data set. The fully revised data set consists of the identical data series as the real-time data set, except that data revisions known as of the last period of our sample, 1998:12, are incorporated. Note that, in both this database and the one described next, we adopted timing conventions consistent with the real-time database. For example, unlike SW, who assume that the CPI for February is known when the February inflation forecasts are constructed, we incorporate the 1-month lag found in real-time data and assume that only the CPI through January is known when the February forecast is made. Similarly, the value of fourth-quarter GDP is assumed not to be known until February, first-quarter GDP is not assumed known until May, and so on.

2.3. *Stock–Watson data set*

Databases differ not only in whether they include real-time or revised data, but also in their breadth of coverage. Unfortunately, our real-time data set is necessarily somewhat limited both in the number and scope of the time series included. If forecasts constructed with this data set are poor, we would like to know whether the

⁵We thank these authors for graciously providing us with their data.

⁶Our results were robust to excluding the CPI and PPI components and to various alternative assumptions about the timing of information.

problem is the SW method or simply the limited information in the database. To isolate this factor, we reproduced all our forecasting results using the unbalanced, large (215 variables), and revised database used by [SW \(2002\)](#). The SW data were originally obtained from the DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics database.

2.4. Forecasting results

For each of the three data sets, we conducted simulated estimation and forecasting exercises for CPI inflation, industrial production, and the unemployment rate, at both 6- and 12-month horizons. Recursive forecasts were made from the perspective of each month from January 1970 to December 1998, using only the data that (in principle at least) would have been available at each date. More specifically, we began by re-estimating the SW model for each month from January 1970 on, assuming three distinct factors per period.⁷ Following SW, we then constructed forecasts of each variable using: (1) the estimated factors plus autoregressive terms in the forecasted variable (these forecasts are designated FM-AR), (2) the estimated factors augmented by VAR terms in inflation, industrial production, unemployment, and the federal funds rate (FM-VAR), (3) a purely autoregressive model in the forecasted variable (AR); and (4) the vector autoregressive terms in inflation, real activity, and the federal funds rate only (VAR). For each period's estimation, the Schwartz information criterion (BIC) was used to determine the number of lags of the factors (between 0 and 3) and of the additional variables (between 1 and 6) included in the forecasting equation. Lagged variables used in the forecasting models were in all cases taken from the real-time data set, so that any differences in forecasts arise solely from differences in the estimated factors, not the auxiliary forecasting variables. The root mean square error (RMSE) of forecasts was constructed by comparing model forecasts to the finally revised data.

[Table 1](#) shows the results. For each variable to be forecasted, entries in the table show the mean square error of forecast relative to that of the forecast from a baseline autoregressive model (with no factors). Of the two numbers given in each entry, the first refers to the 6-month horizon and the second to the 12-month horizon. The absolute RMSEs for the AR model are reported below each portion of the table. The results suggest three conclusions.

First, for the real-time data set, the forecasting performance of the factor model is moderately disappointing. For CPI inflation, the forecasts that include estimated factors do no better than a simple AR model. On the other hand, the FM-AR model on real-time data performs about 10–15% better than the AR model for industrial production and 15–20% better than the AR model for unemployment.

⁷Note that instead of fixing the number of factors to three, we could have used the information criterion proposed by [Bai and Ng \(2002\)](#) to determine the number of factors in our data set. Experimentation with this criterion gave the result that the number of factors in the data set was quite large (greater than 12). This might not be surprising, however, since this is a *static* criterion, which implies that two lags of a given factor would be counted as two different factors. In any case, the following results were not significantly changed if the number of factors used was between 3 and 6.

Table 1
Relative forecasting performance

	FM-VAR	FM-AR	VAR
CPI ^a			
Real-time	1.04	0.98	1.05
	0.97	0.96	0.95
Revised	1.08	1.00	1.05
	1.00	0.98	0.95
SW	0.83	0.82	1.05
	0.76	0.75	0.95
IP ^b			
Real-time	1.00	0.84	1.17
	1.07	0.92	1.12
Revised	1.06	0.86	1.17
	1.04	0.90	1.12
SW	0.69	0.63	1.17
	0.75	0.65	1.12
Unemployment ^c			
Real-time	0.90	0.86	1.06
	0.87	0.80	0.94
Revised	0.91	0.85	1.06
	0.85	0.78	0.94
SW	0.70	0.65	1.06
	0.90	0.55	0.94

Notes: The entries show the mean square error of forecast, relative to the autoregressive (AR) model, for the indicated forecasting method and conditioning data set. Methods are factor model plus univariate autoregressive terms (FM-AR); factor model plus vector autoregression in inflation, industrial production, unemployment, and the federal funds rate (FM-VAR); and a vector autoregression without factors, as above (VAR). Of the two numbers given in each entry, the first applies to forecasts at the 6-month horizon, the second to the 12-month horizon. CPI and IP are forecast as cumulative growth rates, and the unemployment rate in levels.

^a AR RMSE: 1.3 (6-month), 2.6 (12-month).

^b AR RMSEs: 4.1 (6-month), 5.8 (12-month).

^c AR RMSEs: 0.74 (6-month), 1.17 (12-month).

Why does the factor model implemented in real-time data produce at best modest improvements in forecasts? Comparison with the results from the finally revised data set shows that the real-time aspect of the data is not to blame (our second conclusion). The forecasting results from the finally revised data set are quite similar to those obtained using the real-time data.

Another possible explanation for the modest forecasting performance of the factor model in the real-time data set is that this data set, though relatively large, is not rich enough. For example, compared to the SW data set, the real-time data set is deficient in measures of sectoral output, employment and hours, retail and wholesale sales, housing starts, inventories, orders, and earnings. The forecasts from the SW data set reported in [Table 1](#) suggest that these deficiencies have a big impact on forecasting.

Using the estimated SW factors in the construction of the forecasts significantly reduces forecast errors, relative to the AR benchmark, in all cases. In particular, the RMSE of forecast is as much as a quarter lower for inflation, and as much as a third lower for industrial production or unemployment. Hence our third conclusion, that relevant information for forecasting may exist in a wide variety of variables.

Although these results are to some degree mixed, we take them as generally supportive of the SW approach. First, we have seen that the use of finally revised (as opposed to real-time) data is probably not responsible for the good forecasting performance reported by [Stock and Watson \(1999, 2002\)](#), at least for the data used here. Second, we have seen that forecasting performance improves significantly when the conditioning data set contains a wide variety of macroeconomic time series, supporting results in [Watson \(2000\)](#).⁸ The results are likewise consistent with the premise of this paper, that taking account of the data-rich environment of monetary policy may be important in practice.

Another question of interest is whether SW methods might be of use to the Federal Reserve itself. The Federal Reserve already makes regular forecasts, based on a wide range of information. These forecasts are circulated to policymakers as part of the Greenbook briefing and reported, with a 5-year lag, to the general public. [Romer and Romer \(2000\)](#) have documented that Greenbook forecasts are exceptionally accurate compared to for-profit private-sector forecasts, suggesting that the Fed has private information, special expertise, or both.⁹

[Table 2](#) compares the accuracy of Greenbook forecasts to forecasts for inflation and unemployment obtained by the same methods as described above. We consider factor models augmented by both AR and VAR methods and present results based on both the real-time data sets and the SW data set. (Results from the revised data set are similar to those from the real-time data set and hence are omitted.) As it is well known that averages of forecasts are often superior to the components of the average, we also consider “combination” forecasts, that give 50% weight to the FM-AR or FM-VAR forecast and 50% weight to the Greenbook forecast (third and fourth columns of [Table 2](#)). Consistent with the structure of Greenbook forecasts, four RMSEs of forecast are shown in each cell. The top RMSE pertains to the forecast for the first complete quarter after the month of forecast, the second pertains to the forecast for the second complete quarter following the month of forecast, and so on. Forecast errors are calculated only for months in which new Greenbook forecasts are issued (i.e., months of FOMC meetings). So for example, if a meeting is held in January the Greenbook includes forecasts for the second quarter of the year (April–June), the third quarter, the fourth quarter, and the first quarter of

⁸As Chris Sims pointed out to us, further improvements in forecasts might be achieved by imposing Bayesian priors in estimation of the forecasting models.

⁹In contrast to our unconditional forecasts, the Greenbook forecasts are conditional on a given policy scenario (generally of no change in the policy stance). As a result, a comparison of the two set of forecasts might be biased. Note that the same caveat applies to the [Romer and Romer \(2000\)](#) exercise.

Table 2
Comparison with Greenbook forecasts

	FM-VAR	FM-AR	Greenbook and FM-VAR	Greenbook and FM-AR	Greenbook
CPI					
Real-time	2.641	3.262	2.516	2.789	
	3.100	3.721	2.701	3.014	
	2.803	3.512	2.467	2.766	
	3.114	3.607	2.664	2.816	
SW	2.547	3.400	2.377	2.836	
	2.835	3.424	2.530	2.809	
	2.772	3.108	2.430	2.494	
	2.979	3.331	2.521	2.665	
Greenbook					2.770
					2.705
					2.426
					2.554
Unemployment					
Real-time	0.528	0.531	0.446	0.448	
	0.763	0.784	0.635	0.648	
	0.999	0.996	0.797	0.813	
	1.155	1.169	0.907	0.933	
SW	0.490	0.440	0.441	0.420	
	0.690	0.637	0.623	0.605	
	0.855	0.794	0.757	0.748	
	0.963	0.890	0.853	0.844	
Greenbook					0.455
					0.642
					0.789
					0.897

Notes: The entries show the RMSE of forecast, in percentage points, for CPI inflation, annualized, and for the unemployment rate, in percentage points. Results are for months in which a new Greenbook forecast was issued only. The first entry in each box pertains to the first full calendar quarter subsequent to the month of forecast, the second entry to the second full calendar quarter, and so on. For the real-time and SW data sets, forecasts are calculated alternatively by the factor model plus univariate autoregressive terms (FM-AR), or by factor model plus vector autoregression in inflation, output, and the federal funds rate (FM-VAR). Greenbook forecasts are the actual real-time forecasts made by the Federal Reserve. Combination forecasts give 50% weight each to the statistical model and the Greenbook forecast. The sample period is 1981:01–1995:12 for CPI-inflation and 1970:01–1995:12 for unemployment, coinciding with the availability of Greenbook forecasts.

the next year.¹⁰ The comparisons between the Greenbook and other forecasts take account of this timing structure. The sample period is 1981:01–1995:12 for CPI inflation and 1970:1–1995:12 for unemployment, coinciding with the availability of Greenbook forecasts.

Generally, as might be anticipated, Table 2 shows Greenbook forecasts to be more accurate than SW forecasts, which in turn are more accurate than forecasts based on

¹⁰Notice that the precise horizon of the forecast depends on whether the FOMC meeting is in the first, second, or third month of a quarter. We broke down the results by month of quarter and found that they were similar to the results reported in Table 2.

the real-time data set. However, the magnitudes of the differences are not large. Indeed, the FM-VAR model in both the real-time and SW data sets does marginally better than the Greenbook at forecasting next quarter's inflation, and for longer horizons their disadvantage is small. The unemployment forecasts are also generally comparable. These results are interesting, given that [Romer and Romer \(2000, Table 5\)](#) find that the Greenbook outperforms private forecasters significantly in inflation forecasting (albeit for inflation measured by the GDP deflator rather than the CPI).

The results from the combination forecasts are even more impressive. Particularly for unemployment, these weighted-average forecasts seem to do as well or better than the Greenbook at all horizons. Overall, we take the results as providing some evidence that factor-model methods could help the Fed forecast inflation and unemployment.¹¹ An additional advantage of the SW methods is that are statistically well grounded and replicable, as opposed to the “black box” of the Greenbook.

3. Estimating the Fed's policy reaction function in a data-rich environment

In this section we apply the Stock–Watson methodology to a positive analysis of Federal Reserve behavior. We model the Fed's behavior by a policy reaction function (PRF), under which a policy instrument is set in response to the state of the economy, as measured by the estimated factors.

The standard practice in much recent empirical work has been to use tightly specified PRFs, such as the so-called Taylor rule ([Taylor, 1993](#)). According to the basic Taylor rule, the Fed moves the fed funds rate (R_t) in response to deviations of inflation from target (π_t) and of output from potential (y_t):

$$R_t = \phi^0 + \phi^\pi \pi_t + \phi^y y_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (2)$$

Variants of this rule have been considered in which the output gap is replaced by other real activity measures—such as unemployment—and in which lags of the funds rate are included to allow for interest-rate smoothing.

More recently, some papers ([Battini and Haldane, 1999](#); [Clarida et al., 1999, 2000](#)) have studied rules in the general form of (2) in which the Fed is assumed to respond to *forecasts* of inflation and real activity. These forward-looking specifications appear to fit well, and they are appealing because they recognize the Fed's need to incorporate policy lags into its decisions. Specifically, these studies have estimated PRFs of the form:

$$R_t = \phi^0 + \phi^\pi \hat{\pi}_{t+h1|t} + \phi^y \hat{y}_{t+h2|t} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (3)$$

where hatted variables indicate expectations, t is the date at which the forecast is being made and $h1$ and $h2$ are respectively the lengths of the forecast horizon for inflation and real activity.

¹¹ Our discussant Harald Uhlig also noted that the SW forecasting approach could be used to obtain better estimates in real time of the current value of variables known to be subject to large revisions, such as GDP.

A variety of methods have been used to estimate these “forward-looking” PRFs (see, e.g., [Clarida et al., 1999, 2000](#), for discussions). Here we estimate PRFs analogous to (3) under the assumption that the Fed uses information from many macroeconomic time series, i.e., a situation in which the dimension of X_t is large. For tractability, we assume as before that X_t obeys an approximate dynamic factor model such as (1), with the factors given by F_t .

Assuming that the PRF is linear and (for the moment) the factors are known, and assuming that the state of the economy is summarized by the factors, we can write a reduced-form expression for the policy reaction function as

$$R_t = \alpha F_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad (4)$$

where α is a row vector. Absent any restrictions on α , Eq. (4) constitutes a fairly flexible specification of the PRF. For example, it does not preclude a direct policy response to a variety of factors, such as (for example) a “financial market factor.”¹² Eq. (4) is also consistent with the specification of the forward-looking Taylor rule, Eq. (3); in this case the response of policy to the factors derives solely from their forecasting power for inflation and real activity. To illustrate, suppose we had a known forecasting model based on the factors. Then forecasts would be given by

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\pi}_{t+h1|t} &= \gamma_t^\pi F_t^\pi, \\ \hat{y}_{t+h2|t} &= \gamma_t^y F_t^y, \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where F_t^π and F_t^y are subsets of F_t and the γ ’s are conformable row vectors. Substituting (5) into (3) we get the following reduced-form expression for the forward-looking Taylor rule:

$$R_t = \phi^0 + \phi^\pi \gamma_t^\pi F_t^\pi + \phi^y \gamma_t^y F_t^y + \varepsilon_t, \quad (6)$$

Comparing expressions (6) and (3) we see that the restrictions imposed by the forward-looking Taylor rule specification can be precisely identified. If the factors and the forecasting model were known, it would thus be possible to test if this Taylor rule specification accurately describes Fed behavior, and if not, to determine to what other information the Fed is responding.

However, the factors F_t are of course not observed in practice and need to be estimated. The forecasting model required to obtain $\hat{\pi}_{t+h1|t}$ and $\hat{y}_{t+h2|t}$ is also unknown; that is, the parameters γ^π and γ^y must be estimated. Further, since we want to think of the Fed as continuously updating its knowledge of the economy, i.e., as simultaneously re-estimating the forecasting models and estimating the factors as new data become available, the relationship between (6) and (3) is more complicated than the previous paragraph suggests. In fact, a PRF like (6) cannot be estimated directly if the factors are estimated recursively, and there are no simple restrictions relating the parameters of (6) to those of (3). The reason is that while the first element of $\hat{F}_{s|T}$ must correspond to the first element of $\hat{F}_{s|T}$ for any s and t , since

¹²Eq. (4) does preclude the possibility that policy responds to the idiosyncratic error terms ε_t . However, this restriction is inessential, as the equation can be modified in a straightforward way to include additional regressors, possibly including lags of the dependent variable. We include lags of the federal funds rate in the PRFs estimated below.

both are obtained simultaneously from the same information set, there is nothing in the recursive estimation guaranteeing that the first element of $\hat{F}_{t|t}$ corresponds to the first element of $\hat{F}_{s|s}$.

It is however still possible to test the Taylor rule restrictions implicit in Eq. (3). To do so, at each period we compute the fitted values of the policy instrument, $\hat{R}_{t+1|t}$, obtained from estimating

$$R_t = \alpha_t \hat{F}_{t|T} + u_t \quad (7)$$

over the period $[1, T]$. Computed in this fashion, $\hat{R}_{t|t}$ is comparable to $\hat{\pi}_{t+h1|t}$ and $\hat{y}_{t+h2|t}$, in particular it is independent of the normalization of the factors. The structure imposed by (6) can thus be tested by determining if $\hat{R}_{t|t}$ appears significantly, i.e. by estimating

$$R_t = \phi^0 + \phi^\pi \hat{\pi}_{t+h1|t} + \phi^y \hat{y}_{t+h2|t} + \eta \hat{R}_{t|t} + \varepsilon_t \quad (8)$$

and testing if $\eta = 0$.¹³ We call $\eta \hat{R}_{t|t}$ the excess policy response. In addition, if the specification (6) is rejected, the portion of the excess policy response that is orthogonal to the other regressors in (8) becomes a potentially useful diagnostic variable. Specifically, the correlation of the orthogonal excess policy response with the variables in the conditioning data set provides information on which variables, or types of variables, have been incorrectly omitted from the PRF.

Table 3 presents estimated policy reaction functions for the Fed. The first part of Table 3 reports a PRF with only forecasted 12-month ahead inflation on the right-hand side, and no measure of real activity. The second part of the table adds, as a measure of real activity, the difference between 6-month ahead forecasted unemployment and a 5-year moving average of unemployment, the latter proxying for the natural rate.

The forecasts that enter the PRFs come from three alternative sources: FM-AR estimates from the real-time data set and the SW data set, and from the Greenbook. The sample periods for the real-time data set and the SW data set are 1970:01–1998:12 (in addition, we allow 11 years of lagged data for estimation of the factors, as noted earlier). A fair amount of evidence supports the hypothesis of PRF instability, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999, 2000) and Boivin (2001) all found that the Fed’s response to inflation was significantly higher in the post-Volcker era than before. Hence, in addition to full-sample results, we present results for the pre-Volcker (prior to October 1979) and post-Volcker disinflation (after 1982) subsamples. Data availability (specifically, the availability of CPI-inflation forecasts) restricts us to the 1981–1995 sample period for the PRFs employing Greenbook forecasts. We also show results with and without allowance for time variation in the estimated constant term, modeled as a random walk parameter. Time variation in the constant is intended to proxy, among other things, for changes in the Fed’s inflation target or in

¹³ It is important to note that this specification test, and all statistical inference made on the estimated PRF for that matter, is potentially contaminated by the presence of generated regressors. In our case however, the required correction to the standard errors relies on the asymptotic distribution of the factors. Authors’ calculations, based on Theorem 1 of Bai and Ng (2002), show that if $N > T$, the factors can be treated as known. We are indebted to Mark Watson and Jushan Bai for suggesting this point.

Table 3
Estimated policy reaction functions

Data/sample	Response to inflation	Response to real activity measure	Significance of excess policy response
Measure of real activity: None			
Real-time			
1970:01–1998:12	0.683 (0.001)	*	0.003*
1970:01–1979:10	0.822 (0.004)		0.062
1983:01–1998:12	−0.271 (0.795)		0.000*
With TVP			
1970:01–1998:12	1.098 (0.000)		0.012*
1970:01–1979:10	0.973 (0.002)		0.029*
1983:01–1998:12	0.595 (0.769)		0.000*
SW			
1970:01–1998:12	0.804 (0.000)	*	0.196
1970:01–1979:10	0.776 (0.031)		0.957
1983:01–1998:12	1.138 (0.137)		0.001*
With TVP			
1970:01–1998:12	1.223 (0.000)		0.150
1970:01–1979:10	0.967 (0.010)		0.916
1983:01–1998:12	1.552 (0.044)		0.001*
Greenbook			
1981:01–1995:12	2.280 (0.000)		0.517
With TVP			
1981:01–1995:12	1.771 (0.000)		0.573
Measure of real activity: Forecasted unemployment gap			
Real-time			
1970:01–1998:12	0.729 (0.000)	−0.805 (0.048)	0.008*
1970:01–1979:10	0.609 (0.007)	−1.232 (0.000)	0.013*
1983:01–1998:12	−0.255 (0.786)	−1.156 (0.354)	0.000*
With TVP			
1970:01–1998:12	1.101 (0.000)	−1.192 (0.034)	0.013*
1970:01–1979:10	1.040 (0.000)	−1.105 (0.005)	0.002*
1983:01–1998:12	0.389 (0.812)	−2.105 (0.365)	0.000*
SW			
1970:01–1998:12	0.884 (0.000)	−0.895 (0.068)	0.337
1970:01–1979:10	0.628 (0.091)	−1.079 (0.049)	0.563
1983:01–1998:12	0.856 (0.291)	−1.135 (0.264)	0.001*
With TVP			
1970:01–1998:12	1.278 (0.000)	−1.239 (0.047)	0.287
1970:01–1979:10	1.037 (0.012)	−0.707 (0.181)	0.628
1983:01–1998:12	1.335 (0.114)	−1.174 (0.297)	0.002*

Table 3 (*continued*)

Data/sample	Response to inflation	Response to real activity measure	Significance of excess policy response
Measure of real activity: Forecasted unemployment gap			
Greenbook			
1981:01–1995:12	2.281 (0.000)	−0.042 (0.844)	0.506
With TVP			
1981:01–1995:12	1.769 (0.000)	−0.085 (0.699)	0.547

Notes: The tables show estimates of policy reaction functions, for 3 sources of forecasts (real-time database, real-time database plus SW factors, and Greenbook), for various sample periods, and with and without allowance for a time-varying constant (TVP). The dependent variable in each regression is the federal funds rate. Data are monthly. The second column of all tables shows the long-run response of the federal funds rate (that is, the response adjusted for estimated second-order AR terms in the dependent variable) to a change in the 12-month inflation forecast. The *p*-value of the estimated short-run response of the funds rate is shown in parentheses next to the associated long-run value. The third column shows, in analogous fashion, the long-run response of the funds rate to a change in a forecasted measure of real activity (none in the first table and the forecasted 6-month ahead unemployment rate less a 5-year moving average in the second table). The fourth column shows the *p*-value for the estimated coefficient of the forecasted funds rate, when the latter is added to the regression. A low *p*-value indicates that variables affecting the Fed's policy choice have likely been omitted (a * designates *p*-values below 0.05).

the natural real rate of interest. As in [Clarida et al. \(1999, 2000\)](#), we include two (monthly) autoregressive terms in the federal funds rate, to allow for the possibility of interest-rate smoothing.

The second and third columns of [Table 3](#) report long-run responses (that is, adjusted for the estimated AR parameters) of the funds rate to, respectively, the inflation and real activity measures. Also reported in these columns, in parentheses, are *p*-values for the estimated (short-run) response of the funds rate to changes in forecast. The fourth column reports the *p*-value that arises when the “excess policy response” is added to the PRF, with values under 0.05 indicated by an asterisk. As discussed above, a significant coefficient on the excess policy response is indicative of misspecification.

A summary of the results of [Table 3](#) is as follows. First, the estimates are broadly reasonable. The estimated long-run response coefficients are generally of the expected sign and in most cases highly statistically significant. In the few cases where the sign is “wrong” (notably, in the coefficient on expected inflation for the real-time data set and in the post-1983 subsample), the estimated coefficient never approaches significance. A troubling aspect of the estimates is that the coefficient on expected inflation is often found to be less than one, implying violation of the standard stability condition. This problem is less pronounced when the constant is allowed to be time-varying (as theory suggests it should be). The magnitude of the response of the funds rate to forecasted unemployment (in the second part of [Table 3](#)) is consistently estimated at about −1.0, which seems reasonable. (Note that a Taylor-rule weight on the output gap of 0.5 and an Okun's Law coefficient of 2.5 implies

$\phi^u = -1.25$.) The serial correlation terms, not reported, are always reasonable in magnitude and highly significant.

It is also of interest to compare the results from the three data sets. In earlier sections we found that the real-time data set was the least useful for forecasting, a result that appears to reflect its omission of many important variables rather than its real-time feature per se. We would thus not have been surprised to find insignificant coefficients in the estimated PRFs, as well as a failure to reject the specification (see column 4). In fact, estimates from the real-time data generally find highly significant responses of the right sign; the exception is the post-1983 sample, where the estimated response of the interest rate to inflation is negative (though not significant). In addition, in 11 of 12 cases the “excess policy response” is significantly different from zero. Evidently, there is enough information in the real-time data set to reject this specification of the PRF.

The results based on the SW data set are the more interesting, as we have seen that this data set provides better forecasts. Considering the favored TVP estimates, we find that, with the SW data set, the estimated policy responses to inflation are highly significant and generally greater than one. Further, consistent with earlier studies, there is some evidence that the response to inflation became stronger after 1983, relative to the pre-Volcker period.

In contrast to the real-time data set, the PRF estimates based on the SW data set are not rejected for the full sample or the pre-Volcker sample. However, they are rejected (i.e., the excess policy response is significant) for the post-1983 sample. To investigate the source of potential misspecification, it is useful to look at the correlation of the (orthogonalized) excess policy response with all the variables entering the data set. An informal analysis of those variables whose squared correlations with the excess policy response exceed 0.10 shows that they break down, roughly, into two groups: measures of real activity and interest rates. The finding that measures of real activity are correlated with the excess policy response implies either that the Fed has sectoral concerns, or that its weight on these variables in forecasting inflation and activity differ from those implied by the SW model. The correlation with interest rates suggests to us that financial markets were anticipating Fed actions during the post-1983 period, using information known both to the Fed and themselves but excluded from the data set. Both issues warrant further investigation. Interestingly, for the full sample, few if any variables in the data set are significantly correlated with the excess policy response, consistent with the finding that the estimated PRF is not rejected for the full sample. Thus, for the full sample, the SW forecasts of inflation and real activity seem to account relatively well for Fed behavior.

Finally, we can contrast the estimates to those using Greenbook forecasts of unemployment and inflation. The most striking result is that the response of the funds rate to forecasted inflation is large (1.7–1.8 under the TVP specification) and highly significant. Responses to the unemployment rate are of the right sign, but quantitatively small and statistically insignificant. The implication of these estimates is that, at least since 1981, the Fed has focused aggressively and preemptively on fighting inflation.

These results are generally encouraging. They show that policy reaction functions for the Fed can be estimated in a way that incorporates the Fed's access to large, real-time data sets. This approach also provides a useful and economically interpretable specification test of estimated policy reaction functions.

4. Toward a real-time expert system for monetary policymaking

Section 2 of this paper discussed the potential value of SW methods for forecasting, using large, real-time data sets. Section 3 estimated policy reaction functions, which take as inputs forecasts of target variables like inflation and real activity and produce implied policy settings as outputs. Putting these two elements together suggests the intriguing possibility of designing a real-time "expert system" for monetary policymaking. In principle this system could assimilate the information from hundreds or thousands of data series as they become available in real time, then produce suggested policy settings based on specified forward-looking reaction functions.¹⁴

We do not mean to suggest seriously that machine will replace human in monetary policy-making. But having such a system would have several advantages. First, like the automatic pilot in an airplane or an AI diagnostic system in medicine, an expert system for monetary policy would provide a useful information aggregator and benchmark for human decision-making. Second, because private forecasters or research institutes could replicate expert system results, such systems might enhance transparency and credibility of the central bank by providing objective information about forecasts and the implied policy settings. Of course, a practical expert system would require substantial elaboration over the simple exercises done in this paper.

For illustrative purposes only, in this section we present a "man versus machine" competition, that pits the SW data set and method, together with some alternative PRFs, against the record of Alan Greenspan. Conditional on a data history, we have already shown how the program will pick a policy setting (a value of the federal funds rate). The additional necessary element is a model to simulate the counterfactual history that arises under a different policy regime. We adopt a method of simulation that is simple but seems to work fairly well. We emphasize, though, that whether one likes our simulation approach or not has little bearing on the potential usefulness of an expert system, which would work in real time.

We proceed as follows. First, we assume that the factor structure estimated for the entire sample (that is, with the maximum amount of data) represents the true factor structure of the economy. Taking this estimated factor structure as truth, we calculate and save the idiosyncratic errors for each variable in each period. Second, to add dynamics, we estimate a VAR in the estimated factors, inflation,

¹⁴We think of policy actions as being taken within the framework of a fixed policy regime. For a given policy regime, the unconditional forecast of inflation and real activity equal the expected equilibrium outcome of these variables. Likewise, the interest rate setting implied by the unconditional forecasts of inflation and real activity is consistent with the policy rule.

unemployment, and the federal funds rate, in that order. Inclusion of the final three variables in the VAR (in analogy to the forecasting models of Section 2) amounts to treating these variables as independent factors without idiosyncratic errors. Of necessity we ignore the fact that the factors are estimated rather than directly observed.

Note that the estimated system can be viewed as a standard VAR in inflation, unemployment, and the funds rate, augmented by the estimated factors. This system has several interesting features. First, if we follow conventional practice and treat innovations to the federal funds rate as innovations to monetary policy, we can estimate the impulse responses to policy shocks not only for the variables directly included in the VAR, but for any variable in the data set. The reason is that all variables in the data set can be represented as linear combinations of the estimated factors (plus idiosyncratic noise). Since we can calculate the dynamic responses of the factors to policy shocks, we can also calculate impulse responses for any observed variable.

Second, the inclusion in the VAR of the factors, which carry extra information, should in principle lead to better estimates of the impulse responses of the included variables. We obtained a quite interesting result that seems consistent with this intuition: When we estimate a VAR in the three observable variables (inflation, unemployment, funds rate), we routinely observe the so-called “price puzzle”, that is, positive innovations in the funds rate are followed by increases rather than the expected decreases in inflation. Adding monetary variables such as total reserves and nonborrowed reserves does not change this result. Adding an index of commodities prices, a standard “solution” to the price puzzle, eliminates the puzzle in our data for the full sample but not for all subsamples, notably the post-1983 period. [Sims \(1992\)](#) and others have conjectured that the price puzzle occurs because the Fed has information about future inflation that is not subsumed in the VAR. If this interpretation is correct, then including informative factors in the VAR ought to ameliorate the price puzzle. We find, in fact, that adding the factors substantially reduces and often eliminates the price puzzle; that is, when the factors are included, a positive innovation in the funds rate is consistently followed by a decline in inflation. We plan to explore the properties of “augmented” monetary VARs in future research.

With the model estimates in hand, we are ready to carry out counterfactual simulations of alternative policy rules. The simulations are monthly and, for simplicity, employ only data available at the monthly frequency. We begin the analysis in January 1987, about half a year prior to the accession of Alan Greenspan, and end in December 1998. In each month of the simulation, the Fed is assumed to observe only the data for January 1959 through that month. We use the same timing assumptions as in earlier sections; for example, CPI data are assumed to be observed with a 1-month lag. For each period, we re-estimate the complete factor model and apply the FM-VAR framework to make forecasts of inflation and unemployment. Note that the estimated factor model differs period to period as “new” information becomes available, and in particular it is likely to differ from the “true” data-generating process estimated from final-period data. Based on the forecasts of its

Table 4
Simulations of alternative policies

Policy parameters	$\text{Var}(R_t)$	$E(\pi_t)$	$E[(\pi_t - 2)^2]$	$E(u_t)$	$E[(u_t - u_t^*)^2]$
$\phi^\pi = 1.34$ $\phi^u = 1.17$	1.12	3.38	4.34	6.03	1.61
$\phi^\pi = 1.5$ $\phi^u = 1.25$	2.42	3.37	4.90	6.16	1.88
$\phi^\pi = 2$ $\phi^u = 1.25$	1.44	3.38	4.45	6.06	1.66
$\phi^\pi = 1.5$ $\phi^u = 0$	3.59	3.28	6.48	6.43	2.41
$\phi^\pi = 2$ $\phi^u = 0$	1.39	3.35	5.48	6.30	1.90
$\phi^\pi = 1.34$ $\phi^u = 1.17$	4.94	3.39	5.31	6.02	0.99
No lags					
Actual	3.28	3.31	2.81	5.88	1.30

Notes: π_t is the annualized quarter to quarter inflation (i.e. $400(\ln(\text{CPI}_t) - \ln(\text{CPI}_{t-3}))$) and u_t^* is a 5-year moving average of actual unemployment.

goal variables, the Fed is assumed to choose a value for the federal funds rate, based on one of several forward-looking policy rules that we consider. Except in one simulation, discussed below, we imposed the second-order serial correlation process estimated in the data, which has the effect of assuming that the Fed adjusts the federal funds rate only gradually toward its target.

The value of the funds rate chosen in the simulation typically differs from its true historical value. Policy settings that differ from history are modeled as exogenous changes in the innovation to the federal funds rate. Given the policy innovation, the VAR in the factors and observable variables, the estimated factor structure of the data set, and the historical idiosyncratic errors, we are able to perform recursive simulations of counterfactual histories for alternative policy regimes. Of course, because of the Lucas critique, this exercise is likely to yield reasonable results only if the policy regime being simulated does not differ too radically from those historically observed.

Table 4 summarizes the results for selected simulations, reporting the variance of the funds rate, the means of inflation and unemployment, and the variability of inflation and unemployment around their “target” values. The simulations differ only in the policy rule that is assumed to be in force. Specifically, we choose alternative values of the responsiveness of the federal funds rate to the 12-month ahead inflation forecast (ϕ^π) and to the 6-month ahead forecast of the deviation of unemployment from the “natural rate” (ϕ^u). As in Section 3, the natural rate u^* is

modeled as a 5-year backward-looking moving average of actual (not counterfactual) unemployment.

The baseline policy, shown in the first row of the table, sets $\phi^\pi = 1.34$ and $\phi^u = 1.17$, the values estimated for the post-1983 sample (see Table 3). Subsequent rows of the table show results for alternative values of the rule parameters. The sixth row of Table 4 shows results for a policy rule that applies the historically estimated response parameters, but for which we assume that the Fed adjusts the funds rate each month to its target level without smoothing (that is, no lags of the funds rate are included in the policy rule). The last row of the table displays the corresponding statistics for the actual data.

The results of Table 4 indicate that the counterfactual policy rules achieved about the same average rate of inflation and slightly higher average unemployment, compared to the historical record. However, “man” proves superior to “machine” in that the variability of both inflation and unemployment is generally higher in the simulations than was the case historically.¹⁵ The difference in inflation volatility is particularly sizable. We find this evidence for human superiority comforting and not surprising. Inspection of the actual and counterfactual policy paths suggests that the Fed’s superior performance may be attributed to special information or circumstances recognized by policymakers but not captured by the factor analyses: For example, during both 1992–1993 and 1998 the Fed eased significantly more than predicted by our model, presumably due to financial problems in the economy (the “financial headwinds” in 1992–93, the Russian crisis in 1998). One interpretation is that, in these episodes, the Fed felt that financial conditions had changed the impact of a given change in the funds rate, and adjusted accordingly. In any event, the Fed’s actions in 1992–1993 seem to have been particularly successful, as they achieved lower unemployment in 1993–1996 than implied by the simulations without lasting effects on inflation.

Overall, we are moderately encouraged about the potential of an expert system to help policymakers aggregate continuously arriving information and develop a benchmark policy setting. However, there clearly remains considerable scope for human judgment about special factors or conditions in the economy in the making of monetary policy.

5. Conclusion

Positive and normative analyses of Federal Reserve policy can be enhanced by the recognition that the Fed operates in a data-rich environment. In this preliminary study, we have shown that methods for data-dimension reduction, such as those of Stock and Watson, can allow us to incorporate large data sets into the study of monetary policy.

¹⁵The policy rule without smoothing (row 6 of Table 4) was found to reduce the variability of unemployment, relative to history; however, it delivers much more variability in both inflation and the funds rate itself.

A variety of extensions of this framework are possible, of which we briefly mention only two. First, the estimation approach used here identifies the underlying factors only up to a linear transformation, making economic interpretation of the factors themselves difficult. It would be interesting to be able to relate the factors more directly to fundamental economic forces. To identify unique, interpretable factors, more structure would have to be imposed in estimation. One simple, data-based approach consists of dividing the data set into categories of variables and estimating the factors separately within these categories. In the spirit of structural VAR modeling, imposing some “weak theory” restriction on the multivariate dynamics of the factors could then identify the factors. A more ambitious alternative would be to combine the atheoretic factor model approach with an explicit theoretical macromodel, interpreting the factors as shocks to the model equations. If the model is identified, the restrictions that its reduced form place on the factor model estimation would be sufficient to identify the factors.

A second extension would address the large VAR literature on the identification of monetary policy shocks and their effects on the economy (Christiano et al., 2000). A key question in this literature is whether policy “shocks” are well and reliably identified. Our approach, by using large cross-sections of real-time data, should provide more accurate estimates of the PRF residual. Additionally, the comparison of real-time and finally revised data provides a useful way of identifying policy shocks, as the Fed’s response to mismeasured data is perhaps the cleanest example of a policy shock. Finally, as we have mentioned, the factor structure allows for the estimation of impulse response functions (measuring the dynamic effects of monetary policy changes) for every variable in the data set, not just the small set of variables included in the VAR. We expect to pursue these ideas in future research.

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