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## Chapter 2

# Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies and Processes

The 1998 Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD  
Geneva, October 1998

In an address to the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) in Helsinki at the beginning of this year [Ch.1 of this volume – *Ed.*], I argued that we needed to go beyond the Washington consensus: there were broader objectives to development than were embodied in that consensus, the set of policy recommendations upon which it focused was certainly not sufficient for development, and indeed some of the most successful developers had paid little heed to its dicta. That consensus all too often confused means with ends: it took privatization and trade liberalization as ends in themselves, rather than as means to more sustainable, equitable and democratic growth. I talked there about many of the ways in which the Washington consensus had gone astray. It focused too much on price stability, rather than growth and the stability of output. It failed to recognize that strengthening financial institutions is every bit as important to economic stability as controlling budget deficits and increasing the money supply. It focused on privatization, but paid too little attention to the institutional infrastructure that is required to make markets work, and especially to the importance of competition.

In today's lecture, I want to go beyond these by now well-documented failures of the Washington consensus to begin providing the foundations of an alternative paradigm, especially one relevant to the least developing country. It is based on a broad conception of development, with a concomitantly broader vision of development strategies and a quite different perspective on the role of international assistance and the ways in which it should be delivered. The remainder of this lecture is organized

around five parts. First, I shall describe this broader vision. Second, I shall explain why not only the Washington consensus, but earlier development paradigms, failed: they viewed development too narrowly. I shall outline briefly some of the key factors – beyond the most recent events to which I have briefly alluded – that have helped us realize the inadequacies of the old approaches. Third, I shall outline what I refer to as the key principles of the *new development strategy* based on this broader vision of development. Fourth, I shall outline the major components of what I call the new development strategies. And fifth, I shall conclude with some general observations, focusing on the importance of trade and the work of UNCTAD in furthering development based on this new paradigm.

## I. DEVELOPMENT AS A TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

Development represents a *transformation* of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more “modern” ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, increase lifespans and increase productivity. Key to these changes is the movement to “scientific” ways of thinking, identifying critical variables that affect outcomes, attempting to make inferences based on available data, recognizing what we know and what we do not know.

All societies are a blend. Even in more “advanced” societies there are sectors and regions that remain wedded to traditional modes of operation, and people wedded to traditional ways of thinking. But while in more advanced societies, these constitute a relatively small proportion, in less advanced societies, they may predominate. Indeed, one characteristic of many less developed countries is the failure of the more advanced sectors to penetrate deeply into society, resulting in what many have called “dual” economies in which more advanced production methods may co-exist with very primitive technologies.

Change is not an end in itself, but a means to other objectives. The changes that are associated with development provide individuals and

societies more control over their own destiny. Development enriches the lives of individuals by widening their horizons and reducing their sense of isolation. It reduces the afflictions brought on by disease and poverty, not only increasing lifespans, but improving the vitality of life.

Given this definition of development, it is clear that a development strategy must be aimed at facilitating the transformation of society, in identifying the barriers as well as potential catalysts for change. These notes outline some of the ingredients of such a new development strategy. It is organized around three themes. The first outlines the need for a new development strategy, both the failures of past conceptions and the changes in the world which lead to the necessity of a new conception. The second defines the two critical roles of a new development strategy, catalyzing change and transforming *whole* societies. The third outlines some of the key ingredients of the new development strategy, including the role of the aid donors.

## II. THE NEED FOR A NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The experience of the past 50 years has demonstrated that development is possible, but not inevitable. While a few countries have succeeded in rapid economic growth, narrowing the gap between themselves and the more advanced country, and bring millions of their citizens out of poverty, many more countries have actually seen that gap grow and poverty increase, so that today the number of people living in poverty – even measured by the minimal standard of a dollar a day – is about 1.3 billion. Strategies of the past, even when they have been assiduously followed, have not guaranteed success. Furthermore, many of the most successful countries (representing the largest part of growth within the low income countries) have not actually followed the “recommended” strategies, but have carved out paths of their own.

### WHAT DEVELOPMENT IS NOT: A CRITIQUE OF PREVIOUS CONCEPTIONS

Many previous development strategies have focused on pieces of this transformation, but because they have failed to see the broader context,

they have failed, and often miserably. Most of these have focused narrowly on *economics*. Economics is important: after all, one of the features which distinguishes more developed from less developed countries is their higher GDP per capita. But the focus on economics has confused not only means with ends, but also cause with effect. It has confused means with ends because higher GDP is not an end in itself, but a means to improved living standards and a better society, with less poverty, better health and improved education. By and large, increases in GDP per capita are accompanied by reductions in poverty. It has confused cause with effect because, to some extent, the changes in society which may be called *modernization* are as much a cause of the increases in GDP as a result.

For instance, the development programming models that were popular in the 1960s saw development as simply solving a complicated dynamic programming problem, which would improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources, plus the accumulation of capital (either through the transfer from abroad or through higher savings rates at home). Except for possible inefficiencies in resource allocations (which would be resolved by the dynamic programming problem) and the lack of capital, less developed countries were portrayed as identical to more developed countries.

The same fallacy pervaded the philosophies of the 1970s and 1980s, even though the new approaches saw the problem of development somewhat differently. The central role that government played in the planning/programming approaches was seen as part of the *problem* of development, rather than as part of the *solution*. Governments claimed for themselves too large a role, even though they were intrinsically unsuited for it. Not only did they lack the capabilities, but incentives in the political process ensured that whatever capabilities they had were often directed not at increasing national production, but at diverting rents to the politically powerful. The solution, in this perspective, was reliance on markets, and in particular the elimination of government-imposed distortions associated with protectionism, government subsidies, and government ownership. In the 1980s, the focus shifted to macroeconomic problems, to "adjustment" to fiscal imbalances and misguided monetary policies. Given the macroeconomic imbalances, it was impossible for markets to function, or at least function well.

Notice that all three of these development strategies saw development as a *technical* problem requiring technical solutions – better planning

algorithms, better trade and pricing policies, better macroeconomic frameworks. They did not reach deep down into society, nor did they believe such a participatory approach was necessary. The laws of economics were universal: demand and supply curves and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics applied as well to Africa and Asia as they did to Europe and North America. These scientific laws were not bound by time or space, in their view, which made the technical approach an appropriate one.

### **The lessons of history**

As remarkable as the narrow focus of these approaches was their ahistoric context. They failed to recognize that: (a) successful development efforts in the United States as well as many other countries had involved an active role for government; (b) many societies in the decades before active government involvement – or interference, as these doctrines would put it – failed to develop; indeed, development was the exception around the world, not the rule; and (c) worse still, capitalist economies before the era of greater government involvement were characterized not only by high levels of economic instability, but also by widespread social/economic problems; large groups, such as the aged and the unskilled, were often left out of any progress and were left destitute in the economic crashes that occurred with such regularity.

Indeed, one of the puzzles that these narrow approaches ignored was the failure of certain regions within seemingly developed countries to develop, such as the south of Italy. No trade barriers separated the north from the south; the overall macroeconomic framework in both regions was the same; and the south even benefited from economic policies specifically designed to encourage it. Yet while the north boomed, the south stagnated. This by itself should have suggested that there was more to development than acknowledge by the technical approaches.

### **DEFINING EVENTS**

Three events of the past quarter-century are beginning to shape views concerning development strategies.

### **Collapse of the socialist/communist economies and the end of the Cold War**

The first event is the collapse of the socialist/communist economies and the end of the Cold War. Some have focused on a single lesson that emerges – the inefficacy (and dangers) of a large government role in the economy. From this, some jump to the opposite conclusion: that reliance should be placed on markets. But there are two broader implications of the end of the Cold War: the ideological debates should be over; there should be agreement that while markets are at the center of the economy, governments must play an important role. The issue is one of balance, and *where that balance is may depend on the country, the capacity of its government, the institutional development of its markets*. In other words, development advice should be adapted to the circumstances of the country.

But the failure of the communist system was as much a failure of the political and social order on which it was based as of the economic system itself. The economic models that showed the equivalence between market socialism and capitalist economies were fundamentally misguided, partly because they did not grasp the role of institutions (beyond abstract markets) in the economy, but partly because they did not grasp the importance of the interface between the economy, narrowly defined, and society more generally.

### **The limitations of the Washington consensus**

The second defining event was that many countries followed the dicta of liberalization, stabilization and privatization, the central premises of the so-called Washington consensus, and still did not grow. The technical solutions were evidently not enough. This should not have come as a surprise; as I noted before, history was not encouraging. Moreover, developments in theoretical economics, many of which emphasized the limitations of the market, should have served to provide insights into both the historical as well as these more recent “market failures.”

One prominent example of the limitations of the consensus is provided by Russia, the fuse that set off the most recent financial turmoil in world markets. In many ways, the problems there seem of a very different

nature from those in East Asia, which I will discuss in a moment: in Russia, we see an economy in transition facing huge government deficits and severe political problems. Yet there are some common threads. In both cases, the Washington consensus failed, and for similar reasons: a failure to understand the subtleties of the market economy, to understand that private property and “getting prices right” (that is, liberalization) are not sufficient to make a market economy work. An economy needs an institutional infrastructure. While the banks in East Asia lacked adequate supervision, the banks in Russia not only lacked that supervision; they did not even perform their core function of providing capital to new and growing enterprises. We all know that the standard theorems of economics emphasize that an economy needs both private property and competition. The Washington consensus, while occasionally paying lip service to the latter, placed its emphasis on the former, thinking that with private property, at least owners would have an incentive to increase efficiency. Worries about distribution and competition – or even concerns about democratic processes being undermined by excessive concentration of wealth – could be addressed later! Russia did succeed in turning ordinary economic laws on their head, in that it managed to reverse the usual tradeoffs between equity and efficiency. Reforms such as moving from inefficient central planning to decentralized pricing mechanism, from inefficient state ownership to private property and the profit motive, should have increased output, even if perhaps at the price of a slight increase in inequality. Instead, Russia achieved a huge increase in inequality, at the same time that it managed to shrink the economy, by up to a third according to some estimates. Living standards collapsed with GDP statistics, as life spans were shortened and health worsened. All too late, it was recognized that without the right institutional infrastructure, the profit motive – combined with full capital market liberalization – could fail to provide incentives for wealth creation and could instead spark a drive to strip assets and ship wealth abroad.

### **The East Asian miracle**

The third defining event was the East Asian miracle: the rapid growth of the countries of East Asia showed that development was possible, and that successful development could be accompanied by a reduction of

poverty, widespread improvements in living standards, and even a process of democratization. But for those advocating the technical solutions, the East Asian miracle countries were deeply disturbing. For these countries did not follow the standard prescriptions. In most cases, government played a large role. They followed some of the standard technical prescriptions, such as (by and large) stable macroeconomic policies, but ignored others. For example, rather than privatizing, government actually started some highly productive steel mills, and more generally pursued industrial policies to promote particular sectors. Governments intervened in trade, though more to promote exports than to inhibit particular imports. And governments regulated financial markets, engaging in mild financial restraint, lowering interest rates and increasing profitability of banks and firms (as opposed to financial repression, which results in negative real interest rates). Many of the policies on which the governments focused were simply areas that had been ignored in the past; these included, for example, the heavy emphasis on education and technology, on closing the knowledge gap between them and the more advanced countries. While the impact of individual policies remains a subject of dispute, the mix of policies clearly worked well. Perhaps had these countries followed all of the dictums of liberalization and privatization, they would have grown even faster, but there is little evidence for that proposition. In some cases, such as financial restraint, there is some evidence – as well as a considerable body of theory – that suggests that these policies did enhance growth.

But perhaps the most important lesson of East Asia was that, to a large extent, they succeeded in a transformation of their societies, a fact that is evident to any visitor to the region. To be sure, the transformation is far from complete: witness the sectors in several of these countries that exhibit rigidities and have failed to adopt modern technologies and modes of business. And the crisis facing East Asia today has raised questions in many circles concerning the East Asia miracle. Yet the fact of the *transformation* remains; and even if these countries face a few years of zero or even negative growth, their per capita GDP as they enter the twenty-first century will be a multiple of what it was a half-century ago, and far higher than those of countries that have pursued alternative development strategies. Equally important, poverty rates will be a fraction of what they were a half century ago, though undoubtedly higher than at the beginning of the decade. Literacy will remain

near-universal, and health standards will remain high. A careful reading of the East Asian experience over the last several decades – of what strategies led to those remarkable achievements – will reveal that many of the views reflected here were incorporated in the development strategies of the fastest developers.

### **The East Asia crisis**

This is not the place for an extended exegesis either of the crisis' cause or its depth, and I have spoken extensively about these matters elsewhere. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from the crisis concerning the design of development strategies. These lessons have not been completely lost on the world over the past year, even if they have at times become, in my view, somewhat muddled.

To show how views about development have begun to change because of the crisis, it is worth thinking back to 1997. How much the world has changed in but a short year! A little more than a year ago, in Hong Kong, there was a debate about extending the IMF charter to include a mandate for capital market liberalization. Critics of hedge funds were seen as financial Luddites who wished to reverse the course of history and the inevitable domination of free markets. Countries that encountered economic problems were widely chastised for failing to follow the dictates of the physicians of the modern market economy: they had failed to regulate their financial institutions, they were guilty of crony capitalism, they lacked transparency, they lacked governments that were committed to reform.

Now, a year later, we see things from a more balanced perspective. Yes, good financial institutions are important, and all countries should strive to strengthen their institutions. Yes, transparency is important, not only for the effective working of the economy, but also for there to be meaningful democratic governance. Yes, crony capitalism undermines not only the economy but democratic processes. Reforms in these areas are essential, and the attention that the East Asia crisis brought to these issues is one of the silver linings in the East Asia cloud. All of these issues mark gaps in the Washington consensus as traditionally applied, and hence are clearly welcome topics for discussion that the crisis helped bring to the fore. But events and analysis in the intervening year have cast a new light on many of these issues:

- We now realize that for every borrower there is a lender; and the lender is as much to blame as the borrower. Indeed, to the extent that the foreign banks were *marginal* lenders, they deserve even more of the blame: foreign lenders to Korea's highly leveraged firms (or to banks that had themselves made extensive loans to highly leveraged firms) *knew* that these enterprises debt-equity ratios were far higher than any financial analyst would have called prudent. Yet supposedly well-managed banks, supervised by supposedly sophisticated regulatory authorities, made these loans. Moreover, these loans were not driven by government pressure. Nor was there any evidence of government pressures associated with the real estate loans in Thailand. Is there a suggestion that in some countries bad loans result only from crony capitalism, while in others, they result from the natural working of market processes?
- The difficulties of regulating financial institutions (including banks) has been brought home most forcefully by the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management, the huge hedge fund which reportedly before its crash had an exposure of more than a trillion dollars. The bailout has raised a lot of questions that put a new perspective on the charges in East Asia. Did the bailout represent crony capitalism, given that one of the partners in the hedge fund was a former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board? Did the regulators really not realize the size of the threat? And if so, what does this say about the supervisory capacity of supposedly the most sophisticated regulators in the world, with the longest tradition of regulation, extending for almost a century and a half? If not, what does this say about their understanding of financial markets? Or was the defense of the government role – the threat of contagion – just a cover-up? While Federal funds were allegedly not involved, did the discretionary regulatory powers provide implicit threats (of tighter supervision in the case of non-cooperation) and promises (of regulatory forbearance if the bailout proved costly)? Was there a deliberate attempt by all participants to restrict transparency, by not revealing to the market all the relevant information?
- Statistical studies have thrown doubt on many of the conventional explanations. While macroeconomic policies may not have been

perfect in the crisis countries, Korea at least shows essentially no evidence of an overvalued exchange rate. Transparency on average (at least as gauged by standard measures) was no worse than in other countries that did not experience a crisis; the crisis countries of East Asia had had three decades of remarkable growth, yet, if anything, transparency had *increased* rather than decreased prior to the crisis. Moreover, the last major set of crises had occurred in countries with seemingly high levels of transparency and advanced institutional structures: the Scandinavian trio of Finland, Norway and Sweden.

- Other statistical studies suggested a different culprit: excessively rapid financial and capital market liberalization, unaccompanied by corresponding strengthening of financial regulation (which, as we have just commented, is extraordinarily difficult even in more advanced countries). And indeed, the rapidity of the change in investor sentiment, reflected in changes in risk premia, and the associated massive change in capital flows were of a speed and magnitude that few countries could have withstood. Could even the United States have withstood a change of this magnitude, which relative to its GDP would have meant a reversal in flows of \$700 billion?
- The fact that today countries like Argentina, as well as other countries that have for some years followed sound economic policies, are now being battered has further undermined confidence in the international financial architecture.

These observations have reinforced a close look at the intellectual coherence and econometric evidence in support of the arguments for unfettered capital market liberalization, a position which is increasingly being recognized as being based more on ideology than on science. While the evidence concerning the risks which such liberalization brings is overwhelming, the evidence concerning the benefits is far more scanty. In a lecture I delivered in Fiesole on Thursday, I outlined not only this evidence, but also the theoretical reasons why these results should not come as a surprise. Indeed, the arguments for bailouts, as well as the presence of bailouts themselves, provide overwhelming support for the view that there may be marked discrepancies between private and social

net returns to short-term capital movements. These discrepancies at the very least call for a review of feasible government actions to redress this market failure, which has imposed such huge costs on millions and millions of people (though, to be sure, some of these costs might have been reduced if the crisis-response policies had been better designed).

### III. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The new development strategy takes as its core objective *development, the transformation of society*. It recognizes that an integral part of successful development is the increase in GDP per capita. But this is only part of the story, and even this will not be achieved unless the country adopts a broader development focus. If successful, the new development strategy will not only raise GDP per capita, but also living standards, as evidenced by standards of health and literacy. It will reduce poverty – our goal should be its elimination, a goal that the more successful economies have actually attained (at least by the *absolute* poverty standard). It will be sustainable, strengthening the environment and ensuring real societal transformations.

The discussion is divided into three sections: what development strategies are, and how they differ from *plans*; how we can catalyze *society-wide* change; and why *participation and ownership* are crucial.

#### THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Corporations have increasingly found corporate strategies of use in guiding their thinking and longer-term investments. Development strategies need to be thought of in the same light, rather than as the detailed programming models and development plans of the past, which were derived from a core faith in central planning. Development strategies, while less detailed than these planning documents, are in many ways more ambitious, for they set out a strategy not just for the accumulation of capital and the deployment of resources, but for the transformation of society.

A development strategy needs to set forth the *vision* of the transformation, what the society will be like ten to twenty years from now. This vision may embrace certain quantitative goals, such as a reduction in poverty by half, or universal primary education, but these are elements in the transformation process, not the vision of the transformation itself.

This vision needs to include a view of the transformation of institutions, the creation of new social capital and new capacities, in some cases to replace traditional institutions that will inevitably be weakened in the process of development. In other cases, the new institutions will contain within them elements of the old; there will be a process of evolution and adaptation. Some of these transitions may be difficult, either to articulate or to implement: how will societies that have traditionally discriminated against women achieve a higher degree of equality at the same time that they maintain traditional values?

A development strategy has sometimes been likened to a blueprint, a map of where the society is going. But this metaphor is misleading, and understanding why helps us to see the difference between plans of the past and development strategies of the future. The development process is too difficult for us to write down today a blueprint or a map of where the economy will be going over the next ten years, let alone a quarter of a century. Doing so requires too much information, knowledge that is not currently available. In the past, planning documents have failed to take into account virtually any of the major uncertainties facing the development process. While in principle, a development plan could map out how the economy would respond to the myriad of different contingencies that might occur in the coming years, in practice this is seldom done. By contrast, a development strategy is a living document: it needs to set forth how it is to be created, revised and adopted, the process of participation, the means by which ownership and consensus is to be obtained, how the details will be fleshed out.

The development strategy fulfils several functions as it sets forth its vision for the future.

### **Development strategies and priorities**

All societies are resource-constrained; poor countries even more so. Beyond general resource constraints are the constraints on the capacity of

government, the limitations on the number of issues which it can pursue. While there are many pressing needs, it is imperative that the development strategy set priorities. A key aspect of prioritization is an awareness of sequencing: what tasks have to be done before other tasks. It may, for instance, be essential to establish a competition and regulatory framework before privatization; or it may be essential to establish a financial regulatory framework before capital market or financial sector liberalization.

### **Development strategies and coordination**

In traditional economic theory, prices perform all the coordination that is required in an economy. But this requires a full set of markets – an assumption that patently is not satisfied in less developed countries. Having a sense of where the economy is going is essential: if, for instance, an economy is to move to the “next” stage of development, the appropriate infrastructure, human capital and institutions all have to be in place. If any of the essential ingredients is missing, the chances of success will be greatly reduced. Not only must there be coordination of different agencies within and levels of government, there must be coordination between the private sector and the public, and between various parts of the private sector.

The kind of coordination provided by the development strategy is markedly different, both in spirit and detail, from the kind envisioned (but never actually achieved) in indicative planning. While indicative planning saw itself as a substitute for missing markets, attempting to provide detailed coordination of input and output decisions of various industries, development strategies focus more on the broader vision, including entry into new technologies or new industries.

### **Development strategies as consensus builders**

The process of constructing a development strategy may itself serve a useful function, in helping build a consensus not only about a broad vision of the country’s future, and key short- and medium-term objectives, but of some of the essential ingredients for achieving those goals. Consensus-building not only is an important part of achieving political

and social stability (and avoiding the economic disruption that comes when claims on a society's resources exceed the amount of available resources), but also leads to an "ownership" of policies and institutions, which in turn enhances the likelihood of their success.

## CATALYSING SOCIETY-WIDE CHANGE: BEYOND ENCLAVES AND PROJECTS

If the transformation of society is at the heart of development, the question becomes how to bring these changes about. One of the major roles of the development strategy is to serve as a catalyst, for example by identifying the areas of a country's (dynamic) comparative advantage. Identifying these areas and publicizing such information is a *public good*, and as such is a responsibility of government.

### Transforming whole societies

To be effective, this attempt to serve as catalyst will need to embrace the ambitious goal of encouraging *society-wide* transformation. Earlier, we noted that all too often, development efforts succeeded in transferring technology without transforming societies, in the process creating dual societies with pockets of more advanced technology but little more. In a sense, duality – in which only isolated enclaves are developed – represents a failure of the development process. Our goal is to understand in part what went wrong, why these enclaves did not serve as "growth poles", catalysts of development beyond their narrow confines.

The same could be said about many development projects. A project may be "good" in the sense that it yields high project returns, but it may have little development impact. Of course, high returns are better than low, but if benefits do not spread to the broader society, then the project cannot be judged a true success.

In some cases, the lack of development impact may result from *fungibility*: a country has a range of projects that it wishes to undertake, some with high social returns and some with low, perhaps even negative, returns (sometimes because they are designed primarily to enrich the ruling elites). The country "sells" the good projects to the aid donors,

which allows it to shift its own resources from those projects to others that have low social returns. Ascertaining the *additionality* associated with a project – what occurred that would not otherwise have happened – is often difficult if not impossible. But in any case, we should be aware that the marginal contribution may be far different than it appears at first blush.

Part of the government's role as a catalyst is to undertake projects that can lead to *social learning* – that is, projects from which the country can draw widely applicable lessons, for instance about the viability of an industry. The benefit of the investment is not just the direct returns from the project, but also what can be learned for other projects from its success or failure. Because these learning benefits cannot be appropriated fully by private agents, there will be too little of this kind of experimentation within the private sector. A critical aspect, then, of the government's decision to undertake a particular project should be whether it can be *scaled up*. A project that succeeds only because of massive investment of resources that could not be mobilized more generally, or only because it requires an input which is not generally available, is not a good candidate for scaling up.

To make this point more concrete, let me suggest a couple of examples. A project that provides more textbooks to a school may, for instance, be able to increase the effectiveness of that school, but if there are no resources available to provide similar textbooks to all schools, the project will have very limited development impact. By contrast, a project that develops a new curriculum, one that is better suited to the conditions of the country and motivates children and their parents more effectively, can have nationwide impact, as we have seen in Colombia. A project that demonstrates that local participation in education and local control of rural schools increases school effectiveness (as in El Salvador) can easily be replicated nationwide (or indeed, even worldwide), with limited additional resources. Indeed, such local involvement can itself be a catalyst for community-based development efforts that go beyond education. There are strong *externalities* associated with such projects. Not only do others learn *directly* from how the project itself performs, but in the process of learning to interact to address educational problems, the community learns how to deal with other issues as well, how to engage each other in a process of consensus formation. This concern with scaling up must be at the core of government's involvement with projects, if that involvement is really to have the desired transformative effect.

## **PARTICIPATION, OWNERSHIP, AND THE ROLE OF OUTSIDERS**

The development strategy approach also has clear implications for where the locus of development must be, as I will explain in this section.

### **Why imposing change from the outside cannot work**

This much seems clear: effective change cannot be imposed from outside. Indeed, the attempt to impose change from the outside is as likely to engender resistance and barriers to change as it is to facilitate change. At the heart of development is a change in ways of thinking, and individuals cannot be forced to change how they think. They can be forced to take certain actions. They can be even forced to utter certain words. But they cannot be forced to change their hearts or minds.

This point was brought home forcefully at a recent meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the countries of the former Soviet Union. It struck me that all could articulate perfectly the requirements of sound macro-policy, and that each announced that he subscribed to those policies 100 per cent – including those whose practices deviated markedly from the professed beliefs.

Indeed, interactions between donors and recipients may sometimes actually impede the transformation. Rather than encouraging recipients to develop their analytic capacities, the process of imposing conditionalities undermines both the incentives to acquire those capacities and recipients' confidence in their ability to use them. Rather than involving large segments of society in a process of discussing change – thereby changing their ways of thinking – excessive conditionality reinforces traditional hierarchical relationships. Rather than empowering those who could serve as catalysts for change within these society, it demonstrates their impotence. Rather than promoting the kind of open dialogue that is central to democracy, it argues at best that such dialogue is unnecessary, at worst that it is counterproductive.

### **Ownership and participation**

Thus, key ingredients in a successful development strategy are *ownership* and *participation*. We have seen again and again that ownership is essential for successful transformation: policies that are imposed from outside may be grudgingly accepted on a superficial basis, but will rarely be implemented as intended. But to achieve the desired ownership and transformation, the process that leads to that strategy must be participatory. Development cannot be just a matter of negotiations between a donor and the government. Development must reach deeper. It must involve and support groups in civil society; these groups are part of the social capital that needs to be strengthened, and they give voice to often-excluded members of society, facilitating their participation and increasing ownership of the development process. By involving these groups, the process of strategy formulation may be able to elicit the commitment and long-term involvement that is necessary for development to be sustainable. Ownership and participation are also necessary if the development strategy is to be adapted to the circumstances of the country; our research shows that projects with higher levels of participation are in fact more successful, probably in part because those projects make fewer erroneous assumptions about the needs and capabilities of beneficiaries.

Outside agents, including donors, can encourage ownership through persuasion, that is, through presenting evidence, both theoretical and empirical, that particular strategies and policies are more likely to bring success than other approaches. But the degree of ownership is likely to be even greater when the strategies and policies are developed by those within the country itself, when the country itself is in the driver's seat.

Some, in their enthusiasm for ownership and participation, have implied that these participatory processes by themselves would suffice. But while individuals within a community may actively participate in discourse about what to do and how to do it, there must be more to this process than simple discourse. First, for participation to be fully meaningful, it should be based on knowledge; hence the crucial role of education. Second, merely calling for participation does not resolve the issue of *incentives*: individuals (and groups of individuals or organizations) need to be motivated to be involved. In particular, it will be difficult to sustain participation if participants sense that they are not being listened to, that their views are not taken into account in decision-making. What is required, then,

is participation in a process that constructs institutional arrangements, including incentives. Institutions, incentives, participation and ownership can be viewed as complementary; none on its own is sufficient.

Participation and ownership are crucial, then, and it is clear that the involvement of outsiders cannot take the place of this local ownership. Nevertheless, as I will discuss later, outsiders do have a role in facilitating the process, and in assisting in the provision of resources and knowledge.

### **The need for inclusion and consensus-building**

One of the obstacles to successful development has been the limited ability of some countries to resolve conflicts. The ability to resolve disputes is an important part of social and organizational capital. Reforms often bring advantage to some groups while disadvantaging others. There is likely to be greater acceptance of reforms – a greater participation in the transformation process – if there is a sense of equity, of fairness, about the development process, a sense of ownership derived from participation, and if there has been an effort at consensus formation. Numerous examples (such as Ghana) have shown the importance, for instance, of consensus formation in achieving macroeconomic stability. By contrast, a decision to, say, eliminate food subsidies that is imposed from the outside, through an agreement between the ruling elite and an international agency, is not likely to be helpful in achieving a consensus – and thus in promoting a successful transformation.

## **IV. THE COMPONENTS OF A NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

While the details of a development strategy will differ from country to country, one constant is that since a development strategy outlines an approach to the transformation of society, it must address *all components* of society.

### **Loci of development**

In particular, a strategy must include components aimed at developing the private sector, the state (the public sector), the community, the family and the individual. The different components of the development strategy are intricately interrelated. For instance, at the center of the strategy for the development of the individual is education; but enhancing skills is also critical for the private-sector strategy, and the increase in wages for women that results from improved female education has a strong bearing on the family.

*(a) Private sector development.* In the past, too often development strategies focused on government; this was natural, given that to a large extent, the “plan” was a plan for *public* action, a blueprint for the government. But given the broader role that we see for *development strategies*, it is natural to begin our discussion with the private sector, which will, after all, typically be at center stage.

*A key objective is the creation of a strong, competitive, stable and efficient private sector.* Among the elements of strategies which advance that objective are

- A legal infrastructure, providing (and enforcing) competition laws, bankruptcy laws, and more broadly commercial law;
- A regulatory framework which encourages the private provision of infrastructure where possible, which maximizes the extent of feasible competition, and which ensures that where competition is not possible, there is not abuse of market power;
- The government provision of infrastructure, where private infrastructure does not occur;
- A stable macroeconomic framework;
- A stable and effective financial system, which requires a regulatory framework that not only ensures safety and soundness, but also enhances competition, protects depositors, creates confidence that there is a “level playing field” in securities markets by protecting investors from abuses, and identifies underserved groups within society;

- An adjustment strategy, a strategy for the elimination of those distortions in the economy that interfere with the efficient deployment of resources.

The failure to establish some of the key institutional predictions to a market economy is perhaps one of the factors contributing to the limitations in success of the transition to a market economy of many of the countries of the former Soviet Union. The failure to establish a sound legal and regulatory environment for banks, securities markets and the financial sector more broadly is now recognized to have played a large role in the East Asia crisis. Indeed, the importance of the financial sector for development had been reflected not only in the World Bank's research, but in the Strategic Compact that was formulated well before the East Asia crisis occurred.

If the private sector is to flourish, the environment must be conducive to private-sector development. But much more is also required, including notably an educated, healthy workforce.

*(b) Public Sector Development.* A sector to which the development strategy should pay particular attention is the public sector. After all, if the government cannot manage its own affairs, how can it be expected to manage (or even affect in an appropriate way) the affairs of others? The key question behind the strategy for the public sector is to identify the role of the government – both what the government should do and how it should do it. And the question should not be whether a particular activity should be carried on in the public or private sector, but how the two can best complement each other, acting as partners in the development effort. Related issues include what tasks should be undertaken at what level of government, and how governments can most effectively interact with “civil society”, creating the conditions that are most conducive to the transformation of the whole society.

Central ingredients to the public sector strategy are (i) a focus of the public sector on the unique functions that it must perform, such as: creating the enabling environment for the private sector, discussed in previous paragraphs; ensuring that health and education are widely available; and spearheading the drive to eliminate poverty; (ii) a strengthening of the capabilities of the public sector, including the development of an effective civil service, and a restructuring of the public sector, to

make more effective use of incentives and of market and market-like mechanisms; and (iii) a matching of both responsibilities and modes of operation to the capabilities of the State.

*(c) Community development.* While certain activities are most effectively undertaken at the national (or international) level, much of life centers around communities, and communities are often the most effective vehicle for bringing about the transformation of society. National governments are simply too remote, and the opportunities for meaningful participation are too limited. Well-designed development projects (such as those that have been financed through social funds) can be a catalyst for community development. Participation at the community level allows the project choice to reflect the needs and preferences within the community, and the project design to reflect the local information, ensuring that local conditions and circumstances are taken into account. Equally important, local participation engenders commitment, which is necessary for project sustainability over the long run. And participation in the project itself becomes part of the transformation process. There is growing evidence concerning the relationship between participation and development effectiveness.

*(d) Family development.* A major determinant of success in raising income per capita is population growth, which stems from decisions made within the family. Another major determinant is female education, also a decision made within the family; the impact of female education is reflective of the key role that women play in educating the next generation. During the key formative years of a child, the family is responsible not only for education, but for nutrition and health. More broadly, we have become increasingly aware of the importance of family development, of what goes on within the household. And just as we have become aware of the power of the family as an instrument for development, we have also become aware that in many parts of the world, there are frequent instances of dysfunctional behaviors, including within-family violence.

*(e) Individual development.* In the end, the transformation of society entails a transformation of the way individuals think and behave. Development entails the empowerment of individuals, so that they have more control over the forces that affect their lives, so that they can have

a richer, healthier life. Education and health are at the center of efforts at individual development.

### **Resources, knowledge, and institutions**

We have provided a framework for thinking about development strategies that focuses on five levels – the private sector, the government, the community, the household and the individual. A second cut at the development strategy approach emphasizes not the levels on which it operates, but what it must provide:

*(a) Resources.* As I noted earlier, development entails more than resources: returns to capital, even defined broadly to include human capital, depend heavily on the availability of complementary inputs such as a well-managed economic environment and well-functioning institutions. Nevertheless, it is clear that resources are an important ingredient in development. A development strategy must outline plans for developing physical capital and human capital, as well as preserving natural resources; plans for encouraging saving and investment, and for filling the gap between the two; plans for schools and for financing them; plans for using and renewing natural resources.

*(b) Economic Management.* One of the defining characteristics of less developed countries is a paucity of resources, which is why it is all the more important that the resources that are available are well deployed. Comprehensive development strategies must set out to identify the most important distortions in the economy, and how they are to be addressed, taking full account of the social costs and distributional impacts of policies.

But the ingredients in economic management need to be broader than the traditional lists, which focused largely on liberalization, privatization and macro-stability.

*(c) Knowledge management.* As we have noted repeatedly, development requires closing the gap not only in “objects”, in human and physical capital, but also in knowledge. Knowledge and capital are in fact complements: improved knowledge enhances the return to capital, while additional capital provides the opportunity to make use of recently

acquired knowledge. Incorporating knowledge into the development strategy requires creating capacities to absorb and adapt knowledge (through investments in human capital and in research institutions), investing in technologies to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge, and creating knowledge locally, and absorbing and adopting global knowledge. Thus, a development strategy needs to outline a strategy of knowledge management. The World Bank increasingly thinks along these lines, conceiving of itself as a *knowledge bank*, with one of its central tasks being to help countries to close the knowledge gap. It can provide the cross-country experience that, when melded with local knowledge, makes possible effective choices of development strategies.

*(d) Sector and sub-national strategies.* In many cases, it is useful to narrow one's focus from the whole economy to a sector, to some industry (the health care sector, or agriculture), to some region, to cities (an urban strategy), or to the rural areas. The cities represent an arena in which a cluster of concerns jostle together forcefully – infrastructure, the environment, health, finances. In some ways, cities are microcosms of the economy as a whole, and integrated solutions to a city's problems may provide insights into integrated solutions for the economy as a whole. Moreover, many cities have been more successful in achieving modernization than rural areas, and it is thus natural to focus particularly on cities in trying to achieve societal transformation.

*(e) Social and organizational capital.* Another form of capital, beyond physical capital, human capital and knowledge, is also essential for a successful transformation: social and organizational capital, which includes the institutions and relations that mediate transactions and resolve disputes. I will elaborate a bit on this point, because it is too often given short shrift in policy discussions. Traditional societies often have a high level of organizational and social capital, though this capital may not be of a form that facilitates change. But in the process of development, this organizational and social capital is often destroyed. The transformation may weaken traditional authority relationships, and new patterns of migration may sever community ties. The problem is that this process of destruction may occur before new organizational and social capital is created, leaving the society bereft of the necessary institutional structure with which to function well.

Social and organizational capital cannot be handed over to a country from the outside. It must be developed from within, even if knowledge from outside about key ingredients can facilitate the creation of this social/organizational capital. The pace of change and the pattern of reforms must be adapted to each country's ability to create social/organizational capital. This factor may, in fact, be the most important constraint on the speed of transformation. China has demonstrated that a country can absorb enormous amounts of capital quickly. In the early stages of development, the needs for roads, schools, energy, telecommunications and other elements of the infrastructure are huge, and it is hard to believe that more resources could not be productively used. But simply providing these ingredients does not constitute development.

There has been much talk of late about capacity-building. The (relatively) easy part of capacity-building is providing the human capacity, the education, the skills, the knowledge required for development. The hard part of capacity-building is the development of the organizational/social capital, the institutions that enable a society to function well. There are many dimensions to this:

- The enabling environment for the private sector, which includes markets and the legal infrastructure that is necessary for markets to function well;
- The knowledge environment, which enables new knowledge to be absorbed, adapted to the circumstances of the country, and put to use;
- The policy environment, which includes the capacity to make key decisions concerning development strategies;

### **Consistency, coherence and completeness**

We have described the various pieces that constitute an effective development strategy from two points of view: the levels on which it must operate and the building blocks that it must provide. But the whole is more than the sum of the parts, and the parts must not only be consistent with each other, but must also must fit together, and together set forth a

road map – a vision of the future combined with a framework for realizing that vision.

The development strategy envisioned here is not a one-year plan, or even a five-year plan. The fruits of enhancing nutrition or education of a pre-school child will not be fully developed until a decade or more later. The vision must be long-term, while at the same time pointing to actions to be taken today. To be meaningful, the vision and actions must be set within a coherent framework, which requires setting priorities, encouraging partnership, and taking into account the global and regional environment.

*Priorities.* We know that so much is needed for successful development, including the actions listed above and more. But given limitations on our resources – including our and the developing country's administrative capacities – we need to set priorities. We, and developing country governments, need to focus on leveraging – on identifying areas where their limited actions can have large-scale effects, and where absence of requisite action on their part can have disastrous effects. Although the particular priorities will differ from country to country, there are some common elements.

- Among the most important is *education*, because without education a country cannot develop, cannot attract and build modern industries, cannot adopt new growing technologies as rapidly in the rural sector. But most fundamentally, if development represents the transformation of society, education is what enables people to learn, to accept and help engender this transformation. Education is at the core of development.
- *Infrastructure* – and in particular communications and transportation – is vital for the conduct of business in the modern world. It is also necessary to reduce the sense of isolation of those in developing countries, which is one of the most crippling aspects of underdevelopment. But today, we realize that much of the infrastructure can be provided privately, provided that the government establishes the appropriate regulatory/legal environment. Doing so must be given a high priority.
- *Health* – because an unhealthy population cannot be a productive labor force, because a basic standard of health should be viewed as

a fundamental human right, because it is unconscionable that diseases that could be eradicated or least controlled continue to afflict millions of those in the less developed world, often robbing them of any human dignity.

- *Knowledge* – because, like education, it enriches the human spirit, and because, like education and health, it leads to a more productive society. The power of knowledge is enormous: with increased knowledge, the output that can be produced with limited amounts of resources can be multiplied by orders of magnitude.
- *Capacity-building* – because in the end, successful development, a successful transformation, must come from within the country itself, and to accomplish this, it must have institutions and leadership to catalyze, absorb and manage the process of change, and the changed society.

### **Partnership and country assistance strategies**

The country's own development strategy provides, then, the overall framework for thinking about a country's plan for change. Within that framework, various donors, including the World Bank, can act as partners in the development effort by identifying where they can be most effective. These roles will include not only transferring capital, but also providing knowledge that is essential for development and capacity building.

But partnership goes beyond the country and the aid donors. Recall that development entails transformation of the whole society; hence the whole society must be engaged. The development strategy needs to outline how this engagement will occur. It should describe, for instance, the roles of the local business community and civil society.

### **Consistency with the global and regional environments**

We have emphasized that all five components of the development strategy are interrelated; for instance, strategies for the private sector must be complemented by strategies for the public sector; strategies at the national

level must be complemented by strategies at the community level. At each level, the strategy must be consistent with the environment within which it is embedded, at levels above and below. And all of the strategies are embedded within an ever-changing global environment. This global environment has opened up new opportunities – vast international markets for goods, so that countries need not be limited in their growth to domestic demand, and the possibility of vast flows of international capital to complement domestic resources. But these opportunities have been accompanied by new challenges. For example, heavy dependence on exports of goods or imports of capital exposes a country to the vicissitudes of markets abroad, such as a foreign economic downturn that may close off opportunities for exports or a sudden change in investor sentiment that may reduce sharply the capital inflows from abroad. The magnitude of these risks may depend little on how well the country manages its own economy. It takes strong government actions, and strong economic institutions, to weather these storms – and even then there may be large costs to the economy. For many less developed countries, the impacts may be – and, experience has shown, frequently are – disastrous. An essential part of the new development strategies must be to take advantage of the new global environment while at the same time reducing the country's vulnerability to the inevitable shocks that are associated with global engagement.

All countries, developed and less developed, share our planet, and thus must husband together our globe's scarce resources, including the atmosphere. The preservation of our atmosphere – avoiding the build-up of carbon – is an example of an international public good, the benefits of which accrue to all people. A development strategy needs to set forth a vision of how these international collective needs are to be addressed.

There is another aspect of global development, which becomes particularly important when one sees development through the lens of a societal transformation. We have seen that some countries have had remarkable success in making that transformation, and that there is much those who are in the early stages of a transition can learn from those experiences. As more successes (and failures) occur, these successes (and failures) have impacts on others, as each extracts the lessons that can be learned from each of the experiences. The spreading of experiences no doubt played a role in the successive development of the countries within East Asia.

At the same time, many countries' economic strategies, even more narrowly defined, must be set within the context of developments within their region. This is especially true of small countries, and even more so of land-locked countries, for whom access to markets is critical. But it is not only transportation issues that have to be dealt with on a regional level. There is, for instance, a myriad of environmental and natural resource issues (most notably dealing with water) that can only be addressed at a regional level.

## **V. LEARNING FROM OPENNESS: TRADE, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

Where does openness to the outside world fit into this vision of a new development strategy? Our new understanding of development as a transformation of society – rather than just the accumulation of physical or even human capital – gives us a lens with which to examine this question. It reveals that trade can play a crucial role, although not through the mechanisms that economists have traditionally stressed.

### **Trade and the development transformation**

Let me take a moment to explain this. In the standard textbook model of international trade, openness to foreign goods is supposed to bring benefits primarily through its effects on the market price of imported goods. If Indonesia produces midsize automobiles domestically at a cost of \$40,000 each but can import them at \$20,000 apiece, then opening to auto imports yields a net gain in welfare: the increase in consumer surplus more than offsets the fall in profits enjoyed by Indonesian manufacturers. Indonesia can then move the resources formerly employed in producing cars – the idle labor, human and physical capital and land – and shift them into an industry in which the country has a comparative advantage (textiles, in the classic story). Barring terms-of-trade effects, the resulting increase in efficiency will allow Indonesia to be better off as a result of trade liberalization, even if we don't assume that foreign countries respond with market-opening of their own. The magic of comparative advantage is that a poor country benefits from trade even if, in absolute terms, its

productivity is lower than its trade partners across the whole range of goods.

This standard model tells an important tale, but one that is far from the whole story. There is much more going on, in ways that contribute directly to the transformation of society. Consider the gaps between the standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and what we see in practice. First, both rigorous empirical research and country experience suggests that the growth effects of engagement in the global marketplace are far larger than would be predicted by the standard model. Most specifications of empirical growth regressions find that some indicator of external openness – whether trade ratios or indices of price distortions or average tariff level – is strongly associated with per-capita income growth. And countries (especially small, poor ones) that have tried autarky have typically found themselves lagging far behind in development, for reasons that apparently stem in part from their closed borders. Yet the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts gains from trade that are relatively small, consisting only of the well-known Harberger triangles in the supply-demand diagrams. Clearly, something is missing from the standard story.

A second problem is that industry-level evidence is also inconsistent with the standard model. Recall that in that model, trade causes economies to shift intersectorally, moving along their production frontier. But in reality, the main gains from trade seem to come from an *outward shift* of that production frontier, with little intersectoral movement. In essence, trade makes it possible for the economy not just to consume a given basket of goods at lower cost, but also to *produce* a given pre-opening set of goods at lower cost. (And any increase in quantities can be explained by the producer's Harberger triangles.)

What is going on here? The evidence suggests strongly that opening up to the outside world leads to an improvement in the technology of production. When I say "technology", I have in mind something far broader and more important than the technical blueprints that lie behind the production of any given good. "Technology" here means anything that affects the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs – not just blueprints, but also market and non-market institutions and modes of organizing production. A major difference between developed and less developed countries is the difference in the efficiency with which inputs are transformed into outputs; trade reduces the discrepancy.

If what we are concerned about is the transformation of society, then

we must adopt policies that ensure that openness leads to that broad transformation. It is crucial that trade and foreign direct investment not be confined to small enclaves, even if those enclaves give a temporary boost to our statistical measures of national output. For example, a wealth of gold resources in an area far from a country's population base might well be successful at attracting FDI and increasing mineral exports, but may well do little to spur development over the long term. In designing policies to spur openness and capture its potential benefits, we need to focus on realizing the transformative power of interaction with the outside world. To put it succinctly, our goal should be *not a dual economy, but a developed economy*.

Both trade and foreign direct investment have important roles here. Our understanding of how these roles work remains incomplete, but it is growing. I've already spoken a bit about trade. FDI is of similar importance, because when capital enters a country through direct investment, it typically comes in a package with management expertise, technical human capital, product and process technologies and overseas marketing channels – all of which are in scarce supply in the typical developing country. Evidence suggests that if the society puts in place the appropriate complementary policies and structures, FDI can give a boost to the technological level and growth of the host country. The fears about FDI in the 1960s and 1970s were based largely on the notion of FDI as an enclave phenomenon; in its more modern incarnation, which is typically better integrated into the surrounding society, FDI is something to attract, not to fear. International competition among multinationals has become more robust, so that the foreign corporation receives fewer monopoly rents and the host country gets a larger share of the benefits from investment.

### **Implications for the international architecture and financial flows**

In recent months, the rethinking and soul-searching that has followed the global financial crisis has led to much discussion of how to redesign the international financial architecture. The new development strategy that I have outlined here has important implications for that design process. How, for example, should we think about short-term capital? First, note

that short-term capital is especially volatile, as the experience of the past year has reminded us repeatedly. Even as FDI flows have largely continued unabated, short-term capital flows have completely reversed in many of the crisis countries. Second, short-term capital has none of the added benefits brought by FDI – benefits that seem ancillary in the old view of development as accumulation of capital, but that are recognized as *central* when we view them through the lens of the new development strategy. With today's volatility of short-term capital, one cannot make good long-term investments based on this short-term capital. But equally important, short-term capital does not in itself bring development transformation. (Similarly, hedge funds don't bring development, especially if they go bankrupt.) Indeed, in societies with high domestic saving rates and hence relatively low quality of marginal investments, short-term capital may retard that transformation. The high development costs exacted by abrupt capital-flow reversals – the lost years of education, the rise in infant mortality, the job losses – can easily swamp any marginal benefit derived from such flows, as happened in East Asia.

**Implications for the developed countries:  
what are their responsibilities?**

It is clearly in the interest of developing countries to engage fully with the world through trade and through attracting foreign direct investment. But the trade policy agenda for the developing world – or at least the agenda advocated for developing countries by the West – has in recent years suffered from its single-minded focus on liberalization through reduction of trade barriers *in those countries*. To complement this argument, important as it is, we need to ask also; what responsibilities does the *developed* world have in the area of trade policy? It is not for me to lay out all those responsibilities here, but let me suggest several developments that have clearly helped delay the progress toward transformative development through openness:

- First, the Uruguay Round trade agreement – for all the benefits it brought to the world's consumers, producers, and taxpayers – did too little to ensure the opening of markets to developing-country exports. Consider the empirical estimates of net benefits by region,

calculated just after the agreement was signed: according to these estimates, sub-Saharan Africa was a net *loser* as a result of the Uruguay Round. To be sure, Africa failed to gain largely because it did too little to liberalize its own barriers to trade, thus depriving itself of the opportunity to lower costs and spur efficiency and innovation domestically. But the Round also offered relatively little in the way of new market access for the products that Africa is most able to export. As suggested by the experiences of East Asia's economies, much of the learning opportunity offered by trade takes place in export markets, as developing-country firms build relations with sophisticated customers and compete head-to-head with the best producers in the world. Success in export markets requires learning, and the export champions can then bring these lessons home to apply in the domestic market. Note that I am not claiming here that lack of market access is the only, or even most important, barrier to African exports. African countries can still do much to make life easier for exporters, whether by improving communications infrastructure, revamping transportation facilities, or reducing unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles to exports. But market access is one area where the developed world is uniquely positioned to give a boost to the development transformation that I have called for.

- Second, and a related point, is that we must continue working to stem the tide of the new protectionism in the West. As you know, the last two decades have seen a rise in the use of creative new measures to block imports. Examples include nuisance anti-dumping claims, lodged under laws that often make little economic sense; countervailing duties that similarly lack objective justification; and barriers to genetically altered products, which are likely to become steadily more important as developing-country exports make greater use of those products. Developed countries often have the luxury of large and well-paid legal and lobbying industries in their capitals, industries that can be quite innovative in devising new means of restricting competition. From an equity standpoint, it is essential that we stamp out these innovations as energetically as we work to lower developing-country barriers to trade.
- Third, international protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs)

should strike a balance between the interests of producers and users. Those users include not only many firms and consumers within the developing world – who are more often technological adapters and users than innovators – but also the academic community throughout the world (developed and developing). Yes, it is important to give incentives to innovators by ensuring them a return on their investment in R&D. But we must remember that knowledge is a crucial input into production processes, whether in agriculture or high-tech industry, and that unlike physical inputs into production, knowledge can be shared *ad infinitum* without any additional cost. Thomas Jefferson likened the creation of knowledge to the lighting of a candle in the darkness: many other candles can draw their light from that first candle without diminishing its power or brilliance. Excessive protection of IPRs may end this virtuous cycle of knowledge transmission and regeneration in the developing world. There is no easy answer, but that should not stop us from asking questions. It is for this reason that we have devoted a section in this year's *World Development Report* to the issue of intellectual property rights.

In all these cases, we should seek to construct not just good policies, but also a sense that the process by which policies are devised is itself *fair and open*. Without such a sense of fairness, the developing world will retreat from its reforms of recent decades. Worse still, the perception of hypocrisy reinforces the sense of unfairness: even as the more developed countries preach the doctrines of openness, they engage in restrictive practices. Even as they preach that countries must undertake the painful measures of liberalization – which may entail losses of jobs and industries – developed countries use anti-dumping and safeguard measures to protect their own industries that are adversely affected. Moreover, they do so even when their economies are at full employment, so that the risks of extended unemployment are minimal, in marked contrast to the situation in many less developed countries, where unemployment is high and safety nets are inadequate. And even as the developed countries dismiss the political problems facing less developed countries, they justify their own resort to these protectionist measures as necessary to overcome even worse protectionist sentiments within their own countries.

As I said in my Fiesole speech earlier this week, the pendulum of opinion has swung before, and it now risks swinging too far back in

opposition to openness. Our task is to lessen the momentum of this pendulum swing, by increasing the equity of the international architecture for trade and finance. Retreat from openness in the developing world would unacceptably delay the development transformation that it so sorely needs.

## VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

We have learned in the last half-century that development is possible, but also that development is not inevitable. We have learned that development is not just a matter of technical adjustments, but a transformation of society.

In my opening remarks, I referred to the disillusionment with the Washington consensus, which provided a set of prescriptions that failed to foster this development transformation. That consensus was too narrow both in its objectives and its instruments. I have tried in this lecture to set out the foundations of an alternative paradigm to the Washington consensus. In a way, what I have said is far from revolutionary: within the World Bank and the development community more broadly, there has been increasing attention over recent decades to issues of health and education, and we have moved beyond measures of GDP to look at lifespans and literacy rates. We have recognized the importance of economic security, and stressed the creation of safety nets. There has been a growing consensus behind the objectives of democratic, equitable and sustainable development. Here, I have tried to argue that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and that successful development must focus on the whole – the transformation of society. We are well prepared for this task, precisely because we have increasingly taken within our ambit a broader range of issues – even though all too often we have underemphasized important components, such as the role of competition and financial markets and the institutional infrastructure more broadly.

But I have also tried to argue here that a successful development transformation affects not only what we do, but how we do it. Yes, this broader perspective affects the strategies and policies, but it also affects the processes. It argues for openness, partnership and participation, words that too often sound like appeals to the politically correct nostrums of the day. I have tried to argue that there lies behind these words a theory of

development, as well as evidence that these processes can lead to more successful development efforts.

Honesty, however, requires me to add one more word. In calling for a transformation of societies, I have elided a central issue: transformation to what kind of society, and for what ends? Further, some have worried that development will destroy traditional values. In some cases, there will be a clash between science and traditional beliefs. But development today often focuses on the preservation of cultural values, partly because these values serve as a cohesive force at a time when many other such forces are weakening. Maintaining social organization and enhancing social capital are part of the key to successful development transformations. Moreover, it is important to note that much of the progress that is associated with successful development – the mothers who do not have to see their children die in infancy, who see the opening of minds to new knowledge and the increased opportunities – reflect almost universally held values.

But there is a further reason that I believe in openness in trade and openness in process: these contribute to a more open, democratic society. For me, these are values in their own right.

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