Corporate Finance

We estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using matched customs and firm-level bank credit data from Peru. To account for non-credit determinants of exports, we compare changes in exports of the same product and to the same destination byfirms borrowing from banks differentially affected by capital-flow reversals during the 2008 financial crisis. We find that credit shocks affect the intensive margin of exports, but have no significant impact on entry or exit of firms to new product and destination markets.

Researchers typically invoke theoretical assumptions to estimate mark-ups. Instead, we directly obtain mark-ups by surveying Pakistani soccer-ball producers.

Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate governance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of block sale ("exit") can be an effective governance mechanism. Many blockholders are money managers. We show that, when money managers compete for investor capital, the threat of exit loses credibility, weakening its governance role. Money managers with more skin in the game will govern more successfully using exit. Allowing funds to engage in activist measures ("voice") does not alter our qualitative results.

In this paper we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks' financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress?

In this paper, we discuss the role of overconfidence as an explanation for these patterns. Overconfidence means having mistaken valuations and believing in them too strongly. It might seem that actors in liquid financial markets should not be very susceptible to overconfidence, because return outcomes are measurable, providing extensive feedback. However, overconfidence has been documented among experts and professionals, including those in the finance profession.

Despite their strong positive average returns across numerous asset classes, momentum strategies can experience infrequent and persistent strings of negative returns. These momentum crashes are partly forecastable. They occur in "panic" states — following market declines and when market volatility is high — and are contemporaneous with market rebounds. We show that the low ex-ante expected returns in panic states are consistent with a conditionally high premium attached to the option-like payoffs of past losers.

Six years after the passage of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly known as TARP, it remains hard to measure the total social costs and benefits of the assistance to banks provided under TARP programs. TARP was not a single approach to assisting weak banks but rather a variety of changing solutions to a set of evolving problems. TARP's passage was associated with significant improvements in financial markets and the health of financial intermediaries, as well as an increase in the supply of lending by recipients.

We estimate a short term reversal process for daily US equity returns. Over our primary sample period of 1972-2014, and for our sample of the 100 largest traded firms, on average approximately 90% of idiosyncratic price shocks are permanent. The remaining 10% is temporary, and decays exponentially toward zero, with a half life of about 2.5 days. While the rate of decay (the half life) is relatively constant over time, the magnitude decay varies considerably over the sample. Our findings are consistent with the slow movement of capital (Duffie 2010).

We develop a structural model for the analysis of systemic risk in financial markets based on asset price contagion. Specifically, we describe a mechanism of contagion where exogenous random shocks to individual agents in an economy force portfolio rebalancing and endogenously impact asset prices. This, in turn, creates a chain reaction as downstream agents trade in reaction to price changes.