Decision Making & Negotiations

The Covid-19 pandemic crisis is ongoing, and it its wake has brought tremendous loss of life and economic loss, disruption and uncertainty. It has simultaneously brought to the surface important challenges about global healthcare systems, political systems and institutions and their response to the multi-faceted crisis, the connectedness and dependencies of modern economies through global supply chains, and issues of inequity, as manifested in segments of the population that have been most affected in terms of health and economic outcomes through the crisis.

In modern equity markets, participants have a choice of many exchanges at which to trade. Exchanges typically operate as electronic limit order books under a "price-time" priority rule and, in turn, can be modeled as multi-class FIFO queueing systems. A market with multiple exchanges can be thought of as a decentralized, parallel queueing system. Heterogeneous traders that submit limit orders select the exchange, i.e., the queue, in which to place their orders by trading off financial considerations against anticipated delays until their orders may fill.

We propose a parsimonious model of leverage and investment dynamics featuring a diffusion-jump cash-flow process, retained earnings, short-term debt, and external equity. Crucially equity issuance is costly. We show that firms' efforts to avoid incurring equity issuance costs generate empirically plausible target leverage and nonlinear leverage dynamics. Paradoxically, it is the high cost of equity issuance that causes the firm to keep leverage low, in contrast to the predictions of Modigliani-Miller and Leland tradeoff and Myers' pecking-order theories.

The initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic was characterized by voluminous, highly negative news coverage. Markets overreacted to uninformative news, and reacted more to news during high volatility periods. News coverage responded to lagged market activity, and causally impacted contemporaneous returns. The early part of the pandemic was characterized by pronounced feedback between news and markets. I propose a structural break test to identify the presence and end of such feedback episodes. This one ended in March 2020, which was knowable by the end of April.

Pricing is central to many industries and academic disciplines ranging from Operations Research to Computer Science and Economics. In the present paper, we study data-driven optimal pricing in low informational environments. We analyze the following fundamental problem: how should a decision-maker optimally price based on a single sample of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of customers. The decision-maker's objective is to select a general pricing policy with maximum competitive ratio when the WTP distribution is only known to belong to some broad set.

We explore the landscape of public company auditing around the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning several decades, we document that most public companies obtained audits even before the SEC’s audit mandate, which limited the mandate’s impact on audit rates. We further document that these companies selected their auditors based on characteristics reflecting independence and competence, even before the SEC’s mandate.

People often discount future rewards, embracing smaller rewards that are delivered sooner rather than waiting for larger rewards delivered later. Previous behavioral research has demonstrated that people are more patient when options are presented as decisions to accelerate rather than delay consumption. This behavioral effect is well-established in the literature, but the underlying neural mechanisms have not been identified. We examined the neural correlates of delay and acceleration framing in intertemporal choice.

Mutual fund prospectuses contain a wealth of qualitative information about fund strategies, yet a systematic analysis of this content is missing from the literature. We use machine learning to group together funds with similar strategy descriptions, and ask whether they act in accordance with the text. Despite weak legal recourse for investors, we find that mutual funds largely do keep their promises. We document a market-based disciplinary mechanism: when funds diverge from their group's core strategy, investors withdraw capital.

This paper studies systemic risk in the interbank market. We first establish that in the German interbank lending market, a few large banks intermediate funding flows between many smaller periphery banks. We then develop a network model in which banks trade off the costs and benefits of link formation to explain these patterns. The model is structurally estimated using banks' preferences as revealed by the observed network structure before the 2008 financial crisis.