Fundamental Investment Analysis

This research documents an intriguing empirical phenomenon whereby states of relaxation increase the monetary valuation of products. This phenomenon is demonstrated in six experiments involving two different methods of inducing relaxation, a large number of products of different types, and various methods of assessing monetary valuation. In all six experiments participants who were put into a relaxed affective state reported higher monetary valuations than participants who were put into an equally pleasant but less relaxed state.

Leading up to the recent crisis, government encouraged risky lending, and failed to measure banks' risks credibly or to require sufficient capital. Regulators also failed to losses or enforce intervention protocols for timely resolution. This paper proposes radical policy changes to prevent a recurrence. The need is not for more complex rules and more supervisory discretion, but rather for simpler rules that are meaningful in measuring and limiting risk, hard for market participants to circumvent and credibly enforced by supervisors.

A growing literature suggests that even in the absence of any ability to predict returns, holding options on the benchmarks or trading frequently can generate positive alpha. The ratio of alpha to its tracking error appraises a fund's performance. This paper derives the performance-maximizing strategy, which turns out to be a variant of a buy-write strategy, and the least upper bound on such performance enhancement. If common equity indices are used as benchmarks, the potential alpha generated from trading frequently can be substantial in magnitude, but it carries considerable risk.

This paper investigates the question of whether so-called anomalous returns predicted by accounting numbers are normal returns for risk or abnormal returns. It does so via a model that shows how accounting numbers inform about normal returns if pricing were rational. The model equates expected returns to expectations of earnings and earnings growth, so that any variable that forecasts earnings and earnings growth also forecasts required returns if the market prices those outcomes as risky.

This paper proposes an accounting for revenues as an alternative to the proposals currently begin aired by the FASB and IASB. Existing revenue recognition rules are vague, resulting in messy application, so the Boards are seeking a remedy. However, their proposals replace the traditional criteria — revenue is recognized when it is both "realized or realizable" and "earned" — with similarly vague notions that require both the identification of a "performance obligation" and the "satisfaction" of a performance obligation.

In the wake of the crisis of 2008 and onwards, it has become fashionable to return to the work of Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger, and cite them as showing the ubiquity of crises, how they are an inevitable result of human nature, and how they have therefore to be carefully and thoroughly regulated against. Charles Calomiris considers this view, first clearly distinguishing between financial crises and banking crises.

Standard valuation models forecast cash flows or earnings, add a growth rate, and discount the cash flows to their present value with a discount rate that typically reflects the cost of capital. But as the author argues, projecting the long-term growth rate is essentially speculative; and along with uncertainty about the growth rate, analysts generally do not have a good grasp of the discount rate either.

We review accounting principles related to the reporting of marketing activities and evaluate their implications for marketing research and practice. Based on our review, we argue that current accounting practices contribute significantly to the declining influence of marketing within organizations and the rise of myopic management. Financial reports misrepresent marketing contribution and impede its fair assessment. Changes to current marketing accounting practices are needed. Balance sheet recognition of all marketing-related intangibles emerged as the prevailing proposed solution.

Will Rogers, commenting on the Depression, famously quipped: "If stupidity got us into this mess, why can't it get us out?" Rogers's rhetorical question has an obvious answer: persistent stupidity fails to recognize prior errors and, therefore, does not correct them. For three decades, many financial economists have been arguing that there are deep flaws in the financial policies of the U.S.