Fundamental Investment Analysis

This paper studies how hedge fund activism impacts corporate innovation. Firms targeted by activists improve their innovation efficiency over the five-year period following hedge fund intervention. Despite a tightening in research and development (R&D) expenditures, target firms increase innovation output, as measured by both patent counts and citations, with stronger effects among firms with more diversified innovation portfolios. Reallocation of innovative resources, redeployment of human capital, and change to board-level expertise all contribute to improve target firms' innovation.

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies.

The paper draws on Mohanty and Sundaresan (2018) to explore the effects of bankruptcy laws on the ex ante incentive for firms to hedge FX exposures. We use a simple model in which the bankruptcy code may result in deadweight losses, and may allow equity holders a share of residual value of the firm's assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The paper predicts that, while value-maximising firms promise to hedge a higher fraction of the value of their FX exposure when the debt is issued, they may renege subsequently and take on some FX exposures at the expense of foreign creditors.

Value stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks on average, but a “value” position can turn against the investor. Fundamental analysis can explain this so-called value trap: The investor may be buying earnings growth that is risky. Both the earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and the book-to-price ratio (B/P) come into play. E/P indicates expected earnings growth, but price in that ratio also discounts for the risk to that growth; B/P indicates that risk. A striking finding emerges: For a given E/P, a high B/P (“value”) indicates higher expected earnings growth--but growth that is risky.

We propose new metrics for investment performance based on short-run trading profitability. Since investment opportunities are scarce and value-relevant information decays over time, marginal decisions made by fund managers (i.e., trades) should provide more accurate signals about underlying skill than portfolio alphas, which are contaminated by the returns on "stale" positions.

We provide a framework for identifying accounting numbers that indicate risk and expected return. Under specified accounting conditions for measuring earnings and book value, book-to-price (B/P) indicates expected returns, providing justification for B/P in asset pricing models. However, the framework also points to earnings-to-price (E/P) as a risk characteristic. Indeed, E/P, rather than B/P, is the relevant characteristic when there is no expected earnings growth, but the weight shifts to B/P with growth.

The rigidity of mortgage contracts and a variety of frictions in the design of the market and the intermediation sector hindered efforts to restructure or refinance household debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In this paper, we focus on understanding the design and implementation challenges of ex ante and ex post debt relief solutions that are aimed at a more efficient sharing of aggregate risk between borrowers and lenders.

Studies of how quantitative easing (QE) impacts asset prices typically look for effects in one- or two-day windows around QE announcements. This methodology underestimates the impact of QE on asset classes whose responses happen outside of this short time frame. We document that QE announcements by the Fed, ECB, and the Bank of England are associated with: quick price reactions of medium- and long-term government bonds; but with reactions in equity and equity implied volatility that occur over several weeks.

Using a novel sample of professional asset managers, we document positive incremental alpha on newly purchased stocks that decays over twelve months. While managers are successful forecasters at these short-to-medium horizons, their average holding period is substantially longer (2.2 years). Both slow alpha decay and the horizon mismatch can be explained by strategic trading behavior.