Recent deliberations by both the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in the United States have focused on how fair values of assets and liabilities should be measured. The issue of when, rather than how, fair value measurement should be applied is still far from resolved, however.
Weak public institutions, including high levels of corruption, characterize many developing countries. We demonstrate that this feature has important implications for the design of monetary policymaking institutions. We find that a pegged exchange rate or dollarization, while sometimes prescribed as a solution to the credibility problem, is typically not appropriate for countries with poor institutions. Such an arrangement is inferior to a Rogoff-style conservative central banker, whose optimal degree of conservatism is proportional to the quality of institutions.
Recent empirical research documents that the strong short-term relationship between U.S. monetary aggregates on one side and inflation and real output on the other has mostly disappeared since the early 1980s. Using the direct estimate of flows of U.S. dollars abroad we find that domestic money (currency corrected for the foreign holdings of dollars) contains valuable information about future movements of U.S. inflation and real output.
The 1993 Japanese financial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empirically whether underwriting commissions and yield spreads on corporate straight bonds issued domestically fell as a result of this bank entry. The empirical results show that bank entry significantly lowers both underwriting commissions and yield spreads. Commissions charged by banks are significantly lower than those charged by investment houses.
This lecture examines whether financial globalization is beneficial to developing countries by first examining the evidence on financial development and economic growth and concludes that financial development is indeed a key element in promoting economic growth. It then asks why if financial development is so beneficial, it often doesn't occur. It then goes on to examine whether globalization, particularly of the financial kind, can help encourage financial and economic development and argues that it can.
Many prominent critics regard the international financial system as the dark side of globalization. But in this book, economist Frederic Mishkin argues that financial globalization today is essential for poor nations to become rich. Mishkin argues that an effectively managed financial globalization promises benefits on the scale of the hugely successful trade and information globalizations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This financial revolution can lift developing nations out of poverty and increase the wealth and stability of emerging and industrialized nations alike.
We develop a model of lending and borrowing in markets where the lender has no access to physical collateral and where the borrower is heavily capital constrained. Our model of micro loans, which incorporates a) the absence of access to physical collateral, b) peer monitoring, c) threat of punishment upon default, and d) costly monitoring by lenders is used to determine the equilibrium borrowing rates. Monitoring by lenders is shown to be critical for an equilibrium to exist in our model if the maturity of the loan is too long.
We analyze the relationship between conglomerates' internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources.
To understand why developing countries do not automatically benefit from financial globalization, both the need for a minimum institutional quality (the threshold hypothesis) and the possibility of varying volatility of different types of capital flows (the composition hypothesis) have been suggested. This paper contends that the two hypotheses are intimately linked, and provides supportive empirical evidence.