Organizations & Markets

We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in repo markets, which is an important first stage of monetary policy transmission. In the European repo market, most participants do not have access to trade on centralized exchanges. Rather, they rely on OTC intermediation by a small number of dealers that exhibit significant market power. As a result, the passthrough of the ECB's policy rate to repo markets is inefficient and unequal.

The chapter proposes an ‘open video system’ to deal with digital dominance in the online streaming video sector. TV, in its third generation, is becoming online-based and, due to the fundamental technology and economics of the medium, controlled by a few global platforms. The extent is shown by market concentration numbers developed in the chapter. How to deal with this problem? Instead of following the breakup or public utility models, the chapter advocates the enablement of information intermediaries that would act on behalf of consumers.

We provide an applied introduction to Bayesian estimation methods for empirical accounting research. To showcase the methods, we compare and contrast the estimation of accruals models via a Bayesian approach with the literature’s standard approach. The standard approach takes a given model of normal accruals for granted and neglects any uncertainty about the model and its parameters. By contrast, our Bayesian approach allows incorporating parameter and model uncertainty into the estimation of normal accruals.

We follow a representative panel of millions of consumers in the U.S. from 2007 to 2017 and document several facts on the long-term effects of the Great Recession. There were about six million foreclosures in the ten-year period after Lehman's collapse. Owners of multiple homes accounted for 25% of these foreclosures, while comprising only 13% of the market. Foreclosures displaced homeowners, with most of them moving at least once. Only a quarter of foreclosed households regained homeownership, taking an average four years to do so.

We extract aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks for the US economy from macroeconomic data on inflation, real GDP growth, core inflation and the unemployment gap. We first use unconditional non-Gaussian features in the data to achieve identification of these structural shocks while imposing minimal economic assumptions. We find that recessions in the 1970s and 1980s are better characterized as driven by supply shocks while later recessions were driven primarily by demand shocks. The Great Recession exhibited large negative shocks to both demand and supply.

We propose a parsimonious model of leverage and investment dynamics featuring a diffusion-jump cash-flow process, retained earnings, short-term debt, and external equity. Crucially equity issuance is costly. We show that firms' efforts to avoid incurring equity issuance costs generate empirically plausible target leverage and nonlinear leverage dynamics. Paradoxically, it is the high cost of equity issuance that causes the firm to keep leverage low, in contrast to the predictions of Modigliani-Miller and Leland tradeoff and Myers' pecking-order theories.

The initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic was characterized by voluminous, highly negative news coverage. Markets overreacted to uninformative news, and reacted more to news during high volatility periods. News coverage responded to lagged market activity, and causally impacted contemporaneous returns. The early part of the pandemic was characterized by pronounced feedback between news and markets. I propose a structural break test to identify the presence and end of such feedback episodes. This one ended in March 2020, which was knowable by the end of April.

We explore the landscape of public company auditing around the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning several decades, we document that most public companies obtained audits even before the SEC’s audit mandate, which limited the mandate’s impact on audit rates. We further document that these companies selected their auditors based on characteristics reflecting independence and competence, even before the SEC’s mandate.

We predict and find that regulated firms' mandatory disclosures crowd out unregulated firms' voluntary disclosures. Consistent with information spillovers from regulated to unregulated firms, we document that unregulated firms reduce their own disclosures in the presence of regulated firms' disclosures. We further find that unregulated firms reduce their disclosures more the greater the strength of the regulatory information spillovers.