Organizations & Markets

This paper studies economic policy toward feed grain and livestock markets by applying optimal control theory to a quarterly microeconometric model.

A global portrait of the phase plane for a fishery model is obtained for any acceptable values of the parameters. Three different structures of the phase plane are recovered. The first predicts an eventual collapse of the fishery. The second predicts an unstable limit cycle and an eventual stability of solutions which start inside the limit cycle. The last structure predicts two possible stable equilibria, one with high catch rate, and the other with no catch. Each structure corresponds to a different domain in the parameter space.

This paper develops optimal portfolio choice and market equilibrium when investors behave according to a generalized lexicographic safety-first rule. We show that the mutual fund separation property holds for the optimal portfolio choice of a risk-averse safety-first investor. We also derive an explicit valuation formula for the equilibrium value of assets.

This paper is presented within the context of two streams of research which can be identified in the current literature of empirical accounting research. Both of these research areas deal with changes in accounting methods. The first deals with the motivation for changes in accounting methods, and the second area, attempts are made to discover the consequences of accounting changes in terms of the reaction of capital markets to the output of the accounting process.

In recent years productivity bargaining has been heralded as a promising means of increasing productivity in government, particularly at state and local levels. However, analysis of the literature and practice of productivity bargaining indicates that certain inherent conceptual and implementational problems have not been adequately recognized by academics and practitioners. The central problem concerns the failure to recognize that productivity gains may be counterproductive if accompanied by excessive unit cost increases.

Can collective bargaining and the merit system co-exist in public employment? Many writers in the field think that concepts of merit must give way to seniority in government service, as it has in the private sector. The authors believe that view is incorrect. Indeed, by pressing for equity, and an end to patronage, unions may even be contributing to the strengthening of the merit system.

The article explores the increasing popularity and importance of interest arbitration with regard to resolving collective bargaining disputes in public sector labor relations in the U.S. In avoiding or terminating strikes that threaten basic public interest, the use of arbitration may pose the only practical means of dealing with the situation. Furthermore, third-party figures brought to negotiating disputes harbors a fairness concept that is often viewed an important ingredient of labor stability.

The degeneration of orderly relationships between city governments and their employees seriously complicates the nature of government and democracy in urban America. While most cities have not yet experienced major minimal labor breakdowns, most city governments do suffer from seemingly chronic conditions, like inadequate revenues and spiraling costs, which easily can serve as catalysts for municipal labor crises. Data show that serious labor relations problems are no longer limited to a few unfortunate cities like New York, the subject of this study.

We study the competitive provision and endogenous acquisition of political information. Our main result identifies a natural equilibrium channel through which a more competitive market decreases the efficiency of policy outcomes. A critical insight we put forward is that competition among information providers leads to informational specialization: firms provide relatively less information on issues that are of common interest and relatively more information on issues on which agents’ preferences are heterogeneous.