Is the U.S. in Recession? CBS Experts Weigh in on the Economic Outlook
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
There is perhaps no topic that is more important for the functioning of a market economy than competition policy. The theorems and analyses stating that market economies deliver benefits in the form of higher living standards and lower prices are all based on the assumption that there is effective competition in the market. At the same time when Adam Smith emphasised that competitive markets deliver enormous benefits, he also emphasised the tendency of firms to suppress competition.
The veteran economist and CBS professor joined Professor Brett House to explore how erratic policymaking, rising tariffs, and politicized institutions are shaking global confidence in the U.S. economy.
During a recent Distinguished Speakers Series event, the Senior Partner and Chair of North America at McKinsey shared leadership insights on AI business strategy, climate innovation, and the future of work.
Insights from Columbia Business School faculty explain how the president’s “Liberation Day” tariffs are fueling market volatility, undermining global economic stability, and impacting the Fed's ability to lower interest rates.
A Columbia Business School study shows that experiencing a recession in young adulthood leads to lasting support for wealth redistribution—but mostly for one’s own group.
Consumers frequently evaluate their own traits before making consumption decisions (e.g., am I thin enough for skinny jeans?). The outcome of these self-evaluations depends on the standard consumers use and on whether they evaluate self in assimilation or contrast to that standard. Previous self-judgment research has focused on self-standards that arise from social aspects of the environment, including people and groups.
Firms often use both objective/verifiable and subjective/non-verifiable performance measures to provide employees with effort incentives. We study a principal/two-agent model in which an objective team-based performance measure and subjective individual performance measures are available for contracting. A problem with tying rewards to subjective measures is that the principal may have incentives to understate the realization of those measures in order to reduce compensation. We compare two mechanisms for overcoming this credibility problem: bonus pools and reputation.
This study examines the voting behavior of independent directors of public companies in China from 2004–2012. The unique data at the individual-director level overcome endogeneity in both board formation and proposal selection by allowing analysis based on within-board proposal variation. Career-conscious directors, measured by age and the director's reputation value, are more likely to dissent; dissension is eventually rewarded in the marketplace in the form of more outside directorships and a lower risk of regulatory sanctions.
An Expected Utility maximizer can be risk neutral over a set of non-degenerate multivariate distributions even though her NM (von Neumann Morgenstern) index is not linear. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an individual with a concave NM utility to exhibit risk neutral behavior and characterize the regions of the choice space over which risk neutrality is exhibited. The least concave decomposition of the NM index introduced by Debreu [3] plays an important role in our analysis as do the notions of minimum concavity points and minimum concavity directions.