Economics Insights @ CBS

We investigate the intrinsic motivation of individuals to report, and thereby sanction, fellow group members who lie for personal gain. We further explore the changes in lying and reporting behavior that result from giving individuals a say in who joins their group. We find that enough individuals are willing to report lies such that in fixed groups lying is unprofitable. However, we also find that when groups can select their members, individuals who report lies are generally shunned, even by groups where lying is absent.

We study the drivers of the emergence of opinion leaders in a networked community where users establish links to others, indicating their "trust" for the link receiver's opinion. This leads to the formation of a network, with high in-degree individuals being the opinion leaders. We use a dyad-level proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates to model the growth of this network. To estimate our model, we use Weighted Exogenous Sampling with Bayesian Inference, a methodology that we develop for fast estimation of dyadic models on large network data sets.

The ability to retain existing customers is a major concern for many businesses. However retention is not the only dimension of interest; the revenue stream associated with each customer is another key factor influencing customer profitability.