Economics Insights @ CBS

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has.

The criminal law's formal criteria for assessing punishment are typically contained in criminal codes, the rules of which fix an offender's liability and the grade of the offense. A look at how the punishment decision-making process actually works, however, suggests that courts and other decisionmakers frequently go beyond the formal legal factors and take account of what might be called "extralegal punishment factors" (XPFs).

Standard principal-agent models commonly invoked to explain executive pay practices do not account for the involvement of third-party intermediaries in the CEO labor market. This paper investigates the influence of one such intermediary — talent agents who seek out prospective employers and negotiate pay packages on behalf of CEOs. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) characterize the hiring of such agents as an obvious example of rent extraction by incoming CEOs.

Using accounting data for 7722 non-financial firms in 42 countries, we examine how the 2007–2009 crisis affected firm performance and how various linkages propagated shocks across borders. We isolate and compare effects from changes in business cycle, international trade, and external financing conditions, on firms' profits, sales and investment using both sectoral benchmarks and firm-specific sensitivities estimated prior to the crisis.