Economics Insights @ CBS

Housing affordability has become the main policy challenge for most large cities in the world. Zoning, rent control, housing vouchers, and tax credits are the main levers employed by policy makers. We build a new dynamic stochastic spatial equilibrium model to evaluate the effect of these policies on house prices, rents, residential construction, labor supply, output, income and wealth inequality, as well as the location decision of households within the city. The analysis incorporates risk, wealth effects, and resident landlords.

We use supervisory loan-level data to document that small firms (SMEs) obtain shorter maturity credit lines than large firms, post more collateral, have higher utilization rates, and pay higher spreads. We rationalize these facts as the equilibrium outcome of a trade-off between lender commitment and discretion. Using the COVID recession, we test the prediction that SMEs are subject to greater lender discretion. Consistent with this hypothesis, SMEs did not draw down whereas large firms did, even in response to similar demand shocks.

We examine the ability of existing and new factor models to explain the comovements of G10-currency changes. Extant currency factors include the carry, volatility, value, and momentum factors. Using a new clustering technique, we find a clear two-block structure in currency comovements with the first block containing mostly the dollar currencies, and the other the European currencies.

We consider optimal government debt maturity in a deterministic economy in which the government can issue any arbitrary debt maturity structure and in which bond prices are a function of the government's current and future primary surpluses. The government sequentially chooses policy, taking into account how current choices - which impacts future policy -- feed back into current bond prices. We show that issuing consols constitutes the unique stationary optimal debt portfolio, as it boosts government credibility to future policy and reduces the debt financing costs.

Lenders (loan originators) frequently sell the right to service loans to other intermediaries (loan servicers). It is loan servicers rather than originators who are responsible for resolving borrowers’ financial distress. They are also required to make payment advances to investors on behalf of delinquent borrowers until the distress resolution process is complete. We begin with the observation that at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, shadow banks— nondepository financial institutions—serviced approximately half of the total mortgage debt in the United States (Cherry et al.