Is the U.S. in Recession? CBS Experts Weigh in on the Economic Outlook
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
There is perhaps no topic that is more important for the functioning of a market economy than competition policy. The theorems and analyses stating that market economies deliver benefits in the form of higher living standards and lower prices are all based on the assumption that there is effective competition in the market. At the same time when Adam Smith emphasised that competitive markets deliver enormous benefits, he also emphasised the tendency of firms to suppress competition.
The veteran economist and CBS professor joined Professor Brett House to explore how erratic policymaking, rising tariffs, and politicized institutions are shaking global confidence in the U.S. economy.
During a recent Distinguished Speakers Series event, the Senior Partner and Chair of North America at McKinsey shared leadership insights on AI business strategy, climate innovation, and the future of work.
Insights from Columbia Business School faculty explain how the president’s “Liberation Day” tariffs are fueling market volatility, undermining global economic stability, and impacting the Fed's ability to lower interest rates.
A Columbia Business School study shows that experiencing a recession in young adulthood leads to lasting support for wealth redistribution—but mostly for one’s own group.
This article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. I show that if the principal has the bargaining power, she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments, while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power, the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus.
This study offers empirical support for a recently proposed theoretical model of asset market bubbles in which relative wealth concerns cause rational investors to choose to participate in a finite horizon bubble. I find that laboratory asset market bubbles are larger when participants are given upward social information, i.e., are informed of the highest payoff in their market, as compared to downward social information.