Economics Insights @ CBS

During a conversation, it is common for a speaker to describe a third-party that the listener does not know. These professed impressions not only shape the listener's view of the third-party but also affect judgments of the speaker herself. We propose a previously unstudied consequence of professed impressions: judgments of the speaker's power. In two studies, we find that listeners ascribe more power to speakers who profess impressions focusing on a third-party's conscientiousness, compared to those focusing on agreeableness.

As we contemplate the raft of regulatory reforms currently being proposed, it is important not only to consider the content of regulation, but also its structure. In particular, it is important to ask how the role of the Fed as a regulator should change, and how the targets and the tools of monetary and regulatory policy should adapt to new regulatory mandates. For example, some reform proposals envision a dramatic expansion of Fed regulatory authority, while others do not, and some proposals envision the Fed's using monetary policy to prick asset bubbles, while others do not.

We prove generic existence of recursive equilibrium for overlapping generations economies with uncertainty. "Generic" here means in a residual set of utilities and endowments. The result holds provided there is sufficient intragenerational household heterogeneity.

Telecommunications infrastructure goes through technology-induced phases, and the regulatory regime follows. Telecom 1.0, based on copper wires, was monopolistic in market structure and led to a Regulation 1.0 with government ownership or control. Wireless long-distance and then mobile technologies enabled the opening of that system to one of multi-carrier provision, with Regulation 2.0 stressing privatization, entry, liberalization, and competition. But now, fiber and high-capacity wireless are raising scale economies and network effects, leading to a more concentrated market.