Economics Insights @ CBS

The current research investigates whether observers blame leaders for organizational accidents even when these managers are known to be causally uninvolved. Past research finds that the public blames managers for organizational harm if the managers are perceived to have personally played a causal role. The present research argues that East Asian perceivers, who are culturally oriented to focus on the causal influence of groups [Menon, T., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1999). Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions.

Although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market-wide effects (i.e., RPE), there is little evidence to support this theory. Oyer (2004, Journal of Finance 59, 1619–1649) posits that an absence of RPE is optimal if the CEO's reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. We directly test and find support for Oyer's (2004) theory. We argue that the CEO's outside opportunities depend on his talent, as proxied by the CEO's financial press visibility and his firm's industry-adjusted ROA.

This paper compares methods for computing the distribution of loss from defaults in a credit portfolio. The methods are applied in the Gaussian copula framework for credit risk and take advantage of the conditional independence of defaults in this framework. As a benchmark we use vanilla Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the tail probabilities of the total losses of the credit portfolio. The first method to be compared is a recursive algorithm to obtain the exact distribution of the total loss of the portfolio, conditional on observed values for the systematic risk factors.