Is the U.S. in Recession? CBS Experts Weigh in on the Economic Outlook
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
New data has sparked a debate about the state of the economy. Here’s what some of our faculty members had to say.
There is perhaps no topic that is more important for the functioning of a market economy than competition policy. The theorems and analyses stating that market economies deliver benefits in the form of higher living standards and lower prices are all based on the assumption that there is effective competition in the market. At the same time when Adam Smith emphasised that competitive markets deliver enormous benefits, he also emphasised the tendency of firms to suppress competition.
The veteran economist and CBS professor joined Professor Brett House to explore how erratic policymaking, rising tariffs, and politicized institutions are shaking global confidence in the U.S. economy.
During a recent Distinguished Speakers Series event, the Senior Partner and Chair of North America at McKinsey shared leadership insights on AI business strategy, climate innovation, and the future of work.
Insights from Columbia Business School faculty explain how the president’s “Liberation Day” tariffs are fueling market volatility, undermining global economic stability, and impacting the Fed's ability to lower interest rates.
A Columbia Business School study shows that experiencing a recession in young adulthood leads to lasting support for wealth redistribution—but mostly for one’s own group.
Age differences in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the relationships of each to academic outcomes were examined in an ethnically diverse sample of 797 3rd-grade through 8th-grade children. Using independent measures, the authors found intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to be only moderately correlated, suggesting that they may be largely orthogonal dimensions of motivation in school.
This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution.