Economics Insights @ CBS

Much has been learned about emerging markets finance over the past 20 years. These markets have attracted a unique interdisciplinary interest that bridges both investment and corporate finance with international economics, development economics, law, demographics, and political science. Our paper focuses on the research areas that are ripe for exploration.

A planner and agent in a permanent-income economy cannot observe part of the state, regard their model as an approximation, and value decision rules that are robust across a set of models. They use robust decision theory to choose allocations. Equilibrium prices reflect the preference for robustness and so embody a “market price of Knightian uncertainty.” We compute market prices of risk and compare them with a model that assumes that the state is fully observed. We use detection error probabilities to constrain a single parameter that governs the taste for robustness.

We investigate the security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons, focusing on the two-photon variation of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol proposed in 1992 by Bennett, Brasard, and Mermin (BBM92). We present a proof of security which applies to realistic sources, and to untrustable sources which can be placed outside the labs of the two receivers. The proof is restricted to individual eavesdropping attacks, and assumes that the detection apparatus is trustable.

Verhandlungen spielen eine entscheidende Rolle in all jenen Lebensbereichen, die durch Interessenskonflikte gegenzeichnet sind. In Verhandlungssituationen sind relevante Informationen typischer Weise in unzureichendem Maße vorhanden, so dass Verhandlungen meist unter Unsicherheit geführt werden. Folglich sollten Prozesse der Verhandlungsführung von denjenigen psychologischen Mechanismen bestimmt sein, die gemeinhin menschliches Urteilen und Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit charakterisieren.

The author studies the pricing of information with private value (e.g., management consulting, legal advice, medical diagnosis). Anecdotal evidence shows that in some of these markets, competing information sellers split the business to sell only first or second opinions to their customers. The author explains this pricing practice by showing that second-opinion markets are a result of temporal differentiation.