Economics Insights @ CBS

Investigates the explanatory style of religious groups representing fundamentalist, moderate and liberal views. Reason for the optimism of fundamentalist individuals; Causes of the optimism differences among fundamentalists, moderates and liberals; Impact of religious hope on individuals.

In the standard analysis of overlapping generations economies with gifts from children to parents, each generation takes the actions of other generations as given. The resulting equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. In reality, however, parents realize that children will respond to higher parental saving by reducing gifts. For a broad class of gift economies, this implicit tax on saving pushes the equilibrium to dynamic efficiency.

Money managers select weights of managed portfolios to enhance their reputation in the spot market for their services, inevitably using their actions to signal their quality. We develop a two-asset signalling model of money managers. A unique screening equilibrium and (under certain parameter configurations) a host of pooling equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion. In all the equilibria managers behave more aggressively than they would in the absence of the signalling motive, exaggerating their position in the risky asset.

In this paper we develop a model for a capacitated production/distribution network of general (but acyclic) topology with a general bill of materials, as considered in MRP (Material Requirement Planning) or DRP (Distribution Requirement Planning) systems. This model assumes stationary, deterministic demand rates and a standard stationary cost structure; it is a generalization of the uncapacitated model treated in the seminal papers of Maxwell and Muckstadt (1985) and Roundy (1986).

This research proposes that negotiators consider each other's payoffs in their evaluation of potential settlements beyond the level necessary to maintain the bargaining relationship. We further hypothesize that the way in which negotiators weight their opponents' payoffs, relative to their own, is a function of characteristics of the relationship and of the bargainers' personalities. Specifically, we consider liking of the other party, payoff expectations, satisfaction with past settlements, the likelihood of future negotiations, egocentricity, and power orientation.