Asset Management

This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-end discounted closed-end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication among shareholders. Open-ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing them, on average, to half of their original level. The size of the discount is a major determinant of whether a fund gets attacked. Other important factors include the costs of communication among shareholders and the governance structure of the targeted fund.

This article reviews shareholder activism by hedge funds. We first describe the nature and characteristics of hedge fund activism, including the objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We then analyze possible value creation brought about by activist hedge funds, both for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the hedge funds. The evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating performance of target firms.

Under accrual accounting, earnings add to shareholders' equity. Cash flow generated by a business has no effect on the book value of shareholders' equity but reduces the book value of net assets employed in business operations. In short, accrual accounting rules prescribe that earnings add to shareholder value, but cash flow is irrelevant to the valuation of equity. This paper documents that the stock market prices equity shares according to this prescription.

In this paper, we develop a structural model that captures the interaction between the cash balance and investment opportunities for a firm that already has some debt outstanding. We consider a firm whose assets produce a stochastic cash flow stream. The firm has an opportunity to expand its operations, which we refer to as an "option the expand." The exercise cost of the option can be financed either by cash or costly equity issuance.

Accounting is often criticized for omitting intangible assets from the balance sheet. This paper points out that the omission is not necessarily a deficiency. There is also an income statement, and the value of intangible (and other) assets can be ascertained from the income statement. Thus, calls for the recognition of "intangible assets" on the balance sheet may be misconceived. The paper lays out the property whereby the income statement corrects for deficiencies in the balance sheet.

In 3 studies, participants made choices between hypothetical financial, environmental, and health gains and losses that took effect either immediately or with a delay of 1 or 10 years. In all 3 domains, choices indicated that gains were discounted more than losses. There were no significant differences in the discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, but health gains were discounted more and health losses were discounted less than gains or losses in the other 2 domains.

Accounting is often criticized for omitting intangible assets from the balance sheet. With value in firms of today flowing less from tangibles assets and more from so-called intangibles—brands, distribution systems, supply chains, "knowledge capital," "organization capital"—accounting is seen as remiss, with high price-to-book ratios as evidence. The remedy often proposed involves booking these intangible assets to the balance sheet.

How public pension plan assets should be invested is an important but unsettled question. Some observers endorse the standard practice of investing heavily in higher yielding but riskier equities, reasoning that the higher average returns will reduce future required tax receipts and also help to reduce underfunding over time. Others advocate a more conservative approach that reduces the volatility of funding levels and the likelihood of severe shortfalls during economic downturns when government resources are already constrained.