Asset Management

We analyze the role of retail investors in stock pricing using a database uniquely suited for this purpose. The data allow us to address selection bias concerns and to separately examine aggressive (market) and passive (limit) orders. Both aggressive and passive net buying positively predict firms' monthly stock returns with no evidence of return reversal. Only aggressive orders correctly predict firm news, including earnings surprises, suggesting they convey novel cash flow information.

We propose and estimate a structural model of daily stock market activity to test competing theories of trading volume. The model features informed rational speculators and uninformed agents who trade either to hedge endowment shocks or to speculate on perceived information. To identify the model parameters, we exploit enormous empirical variation in trading volume, market liquidity, and return volatility associated with regular and extended-hours markets as well as news arrival. We find that the model matches market activity well when we allow for overconfidence.

This paper studies the "confidential holdings" of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter-end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large, risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information-sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry.

This paper considers a model of (irreversible) investment under uncertainty for a firm facing external financing costs. Such a firm prefers to fund its investment through internal funds, so that thefirm's optimal investment policy and value now depend on the size of its retained earnings. We show that the standard real options results are significantly modified when there are external financing costs.

The SEC is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the ten-day window, established by Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, within which investors must publicly disclose purchases of a 5% or greater stake in public companies. In this Article, we provide the first systematic empirical evidence on these disclosures and find that several of the petition's factual premises are not consistent with the evidence.

It is standard in economics to assume that assets are normal goods and demand is downward sloping in price. This view has its theoretical foundation in the classic single period model of Arrow with one risky asset and one risk free asset, where both are assumed to be held long, and preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion.

We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties — the Proposer and the Responder — who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the underlying investment and termination risk. When the project ends they consume their final accumulated wealth. The Proposer and the Responder have constant relative risk aversion R and r respectively, with R > r > 0.

This article derives and evaluates estimates of the implied cost of equity capital of U.S. insurance companies. During most of the period December 1981 through January 2010, the monthly median implied equity risk premium ranged between 4% and 8%, with a time-series mean of 6.2%. However, during the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the equity premium reached unprecedented levels, exceeding 15% in November 2008.