Asset Management

This paper examines inventory management from an incentive perspective. We show that when a manager has private information about future attainable revenues, the residual income performance measure based on historical cost can achieve optimal (second-best) incentives with regard to managerial effort as well as production and sales decisions. The LIFO (last-in—first-out) inventory flow rule is shown to be preferable to the FIFO (first-in—first-out) rule for the purpose of aligning incentives.

This paper lays out a comprehensive solution to the problem of accounting for claims based the performance of a firm's stock price. The accounting covers employee stock options, stock appreciation rights, put and call options, convertible debt and preferred stock, warrants, and other hybrid securities. This issue has vexed the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) who have approached the problem on a piecemeal basis, leading to inconsistent treatments of claims that in substance are very similar.

We develop a general equilibrium model of a production economy which has a risky production technology as well as a growth option to expand the scale of the productive sector of the economy. We show that when confronted with growth options, the representative consumer may sharply alter consumption rates to improve the likelihood of investment. This reduction in consumption is accompanied by an erosion of the option value of waiting to invest, leading to investment near the zero NPV threshold.

Bayesian learning implies decreasing weights on prior beliefs and increasing weights on the accuracy of the analyst?s past forecast record, as the number of forecast errors comprising her forecast record (its length) increases. Consistent with this model of investor learning, empirical tests show that investors? reactions to forecast news are increasing in the product of the accuracy and length of analysts? forecast records. Moreover, the Bayesian learning predicted by our model is more descriptive of investor reactions than is a static model which predicts that investors?

We survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. We find that managers would rather take economic actions that could have negative long-term consequences than make within-GAAP accounting choices to manage earnings. A surprising 78% of our sample admits to sacrificing long-term value to smooth earnings. Managers also work to maintain predictability in earnings and financial disclosures.

In this paper, we analyze the optimal policy for a risk averse agent who wants to sell a large block of shares of a risky security in the presence of price impact and transactions costs. Our framework reduces to the standard Merton portfolio problem in the absence of any market frictions. Optimal liquidation results in revenue distributions which are substantially different from those generated by a naive strategy. The main tradeoff involves choosing between revenue distributions which have high means versus those which have low variances.

Using pooled cross-sectional data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances, and new panel data from TIAA-CREF, we examine the empirical relationship between age and portfolio choice, focusing on the observed relationship between age and the fraction of wealth held in the stock market. We illustrate and discuss the importance of the well-known identification problem that prevents unrestricted estimation of age, time and cohort effects in longitudinal data.

In asset pricing models, the uncertainty surrounding firm fundamentals plays a central role, driving expected returns, volatility, and valuation ratios. In this paper, we extract estimates of the uncertainty embedded in earnings announcements using option prices. To do this, we take seriously the fact that the timing of earnings announcements, although not the response of equity prices, is known in advance. We develop a no-arbitrage option pricing model incorporating jumps on earnings announcement dates.