Asset Management

We model the trade-off between low-asset risk and low leverage to satisfy preferences for low-risk deposits and apply it to interwar New York City banks. During the 1920s, profitable lending and low costs of raising capital produced increased bank asset risk and increased capital, with no deposit risk change. Differences in the costs of raising equity explain differences in asset risk and capital ratios. In the 1930s, rising deposit default risk led to deposit withdrawals. In response, banks increased riskless assets and cut dividends.

Everyone who has studied international equity returns has noticed the episodes of high volatility and unusually high correlations coinciding with a bear market. We develop quantitative models of asset returns that match these patterns in the data and use them in two quantitative asset allocation analyses. First, we show that the presence of regimes with different correlations and expected returns is difficult to exploit with within a global asset allocation framework focussed on equities. The benefits of international diversification dominate the costs of ignoring the regimes.

We investigate whether the accruals anomaly is a manifestation of the glamour stock phenomenon documented in the finance literature. Value (glamour) stocks, characterized by low (high) past sales growth, high (low) book-to-market (B/M), high (low) earnings-to-price (E/P), and high (low) cash flow-to-price (C/P), are known to earn positive (negative) future abnormal returns. Note that "C" or cash flow is operationalized in the finance literature as earnings adjusted for depreciation.

We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and trading volume when agents face fixed transactions costs. We show that even small fixed costs can give rise to large "no-trade" regions for each agent's optimal trading policy. The inability to trade more frequently reduces the agents' asset demand and in equilibrium gives rise to a significant illiquidity discount in asset prices.

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk.

This study investigates whether banks manage the disclosed fair value of their major asset, the loan portfolio. Using two cross-section samples, I find evidence that suggests banks manage the fair value of loans. The estimated extent of overstatement of loans' fair value is negatively related to regulatory capital, asset growth, liquidity and the gross book value of loans, and positively related to the change in the rate of credit losses.

This article provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for virtually all Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the determinants of bank failure.

In this lecture, I ask two questions: 1) What does "quality accounting" look like? 2) How does the equity analyst deal with "poor quality accounting"? The answer to the first question conveys what the analyst expects of the accountant and so characterizes accounting quality. The second question focuses on the quality of equity analysis rather than the quality of the accounting. How does the analyst recognize the imperfections of accounting—some of which are inevitable, I will argue—and adapt to them?