Corporate Finance

This paper presents a theory of disclosure in a market where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face short-sale constraints. Assets trade above fundamentals reflecting the value of the option to sell to more optimistic investors in the future. The initial seller has an incentive to commit to an imprecise disclosure policy, despite the negative effect this has on the fundamental value of the asset, in order to increase the potential for disagreement and hence the magnitude of the speculative premium.

Recent bank regulations have imposed large compliance costs on banks of all sizes, and have increased the costs of borrowing to both consumers and companies. But in this summary of his recent book, the author argues that the problems with banking system regulation go well beyond the excessive costs. Indeed, Dodd-Frank and other post-crisis regulatory reforms have failed to address the major shortcomings that produced the crisis of 2007–2009. Most importantly, excessive housing finance risk was not dealt with adequately, and is already on the rise again.

Post-2008 financial regulatory changes largely have been a failure. They have produced high compliance costs, while constructing regulatory mechanisms that are unlikely to achieve their intended objectives. Furthermore, financial regulation increasingly has adopted processes that are inconsistent with adherence to the rule of law, which not only threaten the fundamental norms on which our democracy is founded but also undermine the effectiveness of regulation.

This new and fully updated edition of <i>International Financial Management</i> blends theory, data analysis, examples and practical case situations to equip students and business leaders with the analytical tools they need to make informed financial decisions and manage the risks that businesses face in today's competitive global environment.

We find important differences in dollar-based and dollar-neutral G10 carry trades. Dollar-neutral trades have positive average returns, are highly negatively skewed, are correlated with risk factors, and exhibit considerable downside risk. In contrast, a diversified dollar-carry portfolio has a higher average excess return, a higher Sharpe ratio, minimal skewness, is unconditionally uncorrelated with standard risk-factors, and exhibits no downside risk.

Many financial markets operate as electronic limit order books under a price-time priority rule. In this setting, among all resting orders awaiting trade at a given price, earlier orders are prioritized for matching with contra-side liquidity takers. This creates a technological arms race among high-frequency traders and other automated market participants to establish early (and hence advantageous) positions in the resulting first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue.

We consider the problem of A-B testing when the impact of the treatment is marred by a large number of covariates. Randomization can be highly inefficient in such settings, and thus we consider the problem of optimally allocating test subjects to either treatment with a view to maximizing the precision of our estimate of the treatment effect. Our main contribution is a tractable algorithm for this problem in the online setting, where subjects arrive, and must be assigned, sequentially, with covariates drawn from an elliptical distribution with finite second moment.

This paper introduces a novel empirical approach to estimate the effects of an informational friction limiting the reallocation of credit after a shock to banks. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to identify private information separately from information common to all lenders, but unobservable to the econometrician, by using bank shocks within a discrete-choice model of relationships. Applying this approach to the U.S.