Corporate Finance

Loan maturity provides insurance against changes in the price of credit. We examine whether, consistent with theories of insurance markets with private information, maturity choice leads to adverse selection. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers that took identical unsecured 36-month loans, only one of which had also a 60-month maturity choice available. We find that when long maturity is available, fewer borrowers take the short-term loan, and those that do, default less.

The incentive contracts of delegated investment managers may have unintended negative consequences for asset prices. I show that managers who are compensated for relative performance optimally shift their portfolio weights towards those of the benchmark when volatility rises, putting downward price pressure on overweight stocks and upward pressure on underweight stocks. In quarters when volatility rises most (top quintile), a portfolio of aggregate-underweight minus aggregate-overweight stocks returns 3% to 8% per quarter depending on the risk adjustment.

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in shaping the form of an equilibrium contract. If borrowers' homeownership values are known, aggregate wages and house prices determine the optimal state-contingent mortgage payments, which efficiently reduces the costs of liquidity default.

We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the intensity of performance-based incentives, reducing the likelihood of costly termination. We present a novel characterization of optimal dynamic incentive provision when performance-based incentives may decline continuously to zero. Termination happens in equilibrium only if its costs are relatively low.

We would like to share some of our general observations on activism, economics and the macro environment.

We examine short-horizon return predictability using a novel proprietary dataset of institutional traders with known identities. We estimate investor-specific short-term trading skill and find that there is pronounced heterogeneity in predicting short-term returns among institutional investors. Incorporating short-term predictive ability, our model explains much higher fraction of variation in asset returns. Ignoring the heterogeneity in short-term trading skill has major implications in modeling price impact.

I present a model of consumption and savings for multi-person households in which members are imperfectly altruistic and share wealth. I show that, despite having standard exponential time preferences, the household is time-inconsistent: members save too little and overspend on private consumption goods. Access to private illiquid durable goods can exacerbate overconsumption by providing a way for members to lock-up wealth from each other.

Investigations of the basic risk-return trade-off for the market return typically use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with a monthly or quarterly horizon and data sampled to match the horizon even though daily data are available. We develop an overlapping data inference methodology for such models that uses all of the data while maintaining the monthly or quarterly forecasting period. Our approach recognizes that the first order conditions of MLE can be used as orthogonality conditions of the generalized method of moments (GMM).

Building on intuition from the dynamic asset pricing literature, we uncover unobserved risk aversion and fundamental uncertainty from the observed time series of the variance premium and the credit spread while controlling for the conditional variance, expectations about the macroeconomic outlook, and interest rates. We apply this methodology to monthly data from both Germany and the US. We find that the variance premium contains a substantial amount of information about risk aversion whereas the credit spread has a lot to say about uncertainty.