Corporate Finance

We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. Delegation gives rise to a generic conflict of interest mediated by a convex (option-like) compensation contract which is able to align the interests of managers and their shareholders. With such a compensation contract, a given increase in the firm's output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager's income.

This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-end discounted closed-end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication among shareholders. Open-ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing them, on average, to half of their original level. The size of the discount is a major determinant of whether a fund gets attacked. Other important factors include the costs of communication among shareholders and the governance structure of the targeted fund.

This article reviews shareholder activism by hedge funds. We first describe the nature and characteristics of hedge fund activism, including the objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We then analyze possible value creation brought about by activist hedge funds, both for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the hedge funds. The evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating performance of target firms.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of a new and increasingly important phenomenon: the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt claims of the same company by non-commercial banking institutions ("dual holders"). The presence of dual holders offers a unique opportunity to assess the existence and magnitude of shareholder-creditor conflicts. We find that syndicated loans with dual holder participation have loan yield spreads that are 18–32 bps lower than those without. The difference remains economically significant after controlling for the selection effect.

We develop a two sector general equilibrium model with capital accumulation and convex adjustment costs. We use the model to study capital asset pricing and reallocation, as well as optimal consumption and investment decisions. With two sectors, the consumer balances diversification against the potential productivity and efficiency gains of investing more heavily in one sector. The general framework nests and extends standard equilibrium macro-asset pricing models.

Using data on repurchase agreements by primary securities dealers, we show that three classes of securities (Treasury securities, securities issued by government-sponsored agencies, and mortgage-backed securities) can be formally ranked in terms of their collateral values in the general collateral (GC) market.

Particle learning (PL) provides state filtering, sequential parameter learning and smoothing in a general class of state space models. Our approach extends existing particle methods by incorporating the estimation of static parameters via a fully-adapted filter that utilizes conditional sufficient statistics for parameters and/or states as particles. State smoothing in the presence of parameter uncertainty is also solved as a by-product of PL. In a number of examples, we show that PL outperforms existing particle filtering alternatives and proves to be a competitor to MCMC.

We develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial firms, and demonstrate the implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. We characterize the optimal capital structure via a generalized tradeoff model where risky debt provides significant diversification benefits.