Corporate Finance

This paper empirically investigates directors' ownership in the mutual fund industry. Our results show that, contrary to anecdotal evidence, a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds they oversee. Ownership patterns are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. That is, ownership is positively and significantly correlated with most variables that are predicted to indicate greater value from directors' monitoring. For example, directors' ownership is more prevalent in actively managed funds and in funds with lower institutional ownership.

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism.

Hedge fund activism is a new form of investment strategy. Using a large handcollected data set from 2001 to 2006 we find that activist hedge funds in the U.S. propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. The abnormal stock return upon announcement of activism is approximately seven percent, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism.

This paper develops rare-event simulation methods for the estimation of portfolio credit risk—the risk of losses to a portfolio resulting from defaults of assets in the portfolio. Portfolio credit risk is measured through probabilities of large losses, which are typically due to defaults of many obligors (sources of credit risk) to which a portfolio is exposed.

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk.

Since its first publication, Michael J. Mauboussin's popular guide to wise investing has been translated into eight languages and has been named best business book by BusinessWeek and best economics book by Strategy+Business. Now updated to reflect current research and expanded to include new chapters on investment philosophy, psychology, and strategy and science as they pertain to money management, this volume is more than ever the best chance to know more than the average investor.

Consider an economy in which the underlying security returns follow a linear factor model with constant coeffcients. While portfolios that invest in these securities will, in general, have a linear factor structure, it will be one with time-varying coeffcients. However, under certain assumptions regarding the portfolio's investment strategy, it is possible to estimate these time-varying alphas and betas.

Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant. Variation in acquisition premia also can be explained by fundamental deal attributes.

We analyze data on fees paid to investment bankers and acquisition premia paid for targets in cash tender offers. Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant.