Decision Making & Negotiations

This paper addresses a class of single-machine scheduling problems with a common due-date for all jobs, and general earliness and tardiness costs. We show that a class of simple, polynomial, "greedy-type" heuristics can be used to generate close-to-optimal schedules. An extensive numerical study exhibits small optimality gaps. For convex cost structures, we establish that the worst-case optimality gap is bounded by e−i ≈ 0.36, if the due-date is non-restrictive.

This goal of this paper is to establish a research agenda that will lead to a stream of research that closes the gap between actual and normative strategic managerial decision making. We start by distinguishing strategic managerial decision making (choices) from other choices. Next, we propose a conceptual model of how managers make strategic decisions that is consistent with the observed gap between actual and normative decision making.

The impact of item-by-item information accessing on uncertainty reduction is studied under self-selected and researcher-constrained information accessing. Study 1 showed that, at both the aggregate and the individual level, subjective uncertainty reduction assumes several distinct patterns, with the dominant pattern conforming to an accelerating or linear power function. Study 2 revealed that different subjective-uncertainty-reduction patterns tend to be associated with within-options versus within-properties searches. Implications of the findings and the procedure are discussed.

Polling system models are extensively used to model a large variety of computer and communication networks as well as production and service systems in which multiple customer classes or a number of distinct items compete for the capacity of a common server or production facility. In this paper we describe an efficient approximation method for the steady state distributions of the queue sizes and waiting times. This method is highly accurate as demonstrated by an extensive numerical study.

The authors examine how new brand entries affect consumers' consideration sets. A within-subject longitudinal experiment examines several entry positions into existing markets. The results suggest that new brand entries produce changes in consideration sets toward dominating, compromise, and assimilated brands, away from extreme brands in two-brand markets, and toward dominating and away from extreme brands in eight-brand markets. These results are confirmed by a second experiment that utilizes a between-subject design and markets with six existing brands.

This paper examines predictions of a life-cycle simulation model—in which individuals face uncertainty regarding their length of life, earnings, and out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and imperfect insurance and lending markets—for individual and aggregate wealth accumulation. Relative to life-cycle or buffer-stock alternatives, our augmented life-cycle model better matches a variety of features of U.S.

This note considers a principal–multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes–Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining the desired equilibrium).