We analyze a model of optimal capital structure and liquidity choice based on a dynamic tradeoff theory for financially constrained firms. In addition to the classical tradeoff between the expected tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs, we introduce a cost of external financing for the firm, which generates a precautionary demand for liquidity and an optimal liquidity management policy for the firm.
What is a good banker? What is the economic value added of banks? The economics literature on financial intermediation focuses on the role of banks as deposit-taking institutions and as delegated monitors of borrowers. But this description barely begins to represent what banks do in a modern economy. Besides commercial lending, large banks are engaged in a number of other activities ranging from cash management, trade credit, swaps and derivatives trading and underwriting of securities.
Hedge fund managers trade o the benefits of leveraging on the alpha-generating strategy against the costs of inefficient fund liquidation. In contrast to the standard risk-seeking intuition, even with a constant-return-to-scale alpha-generating strategy, a risk-neutral manager becomes endogenously risk-averse and decreases leverage following poor performance to increase the fund's survival likelihood. Our calibration suggests that management fees are the majority of the total compensation.
We track the evolution of financing of residential real estate through the housing boom in the early- to mid-2000s and the resolution of distress during the bust during the late 2000s. Financial innovation, in the form of non-traditional mortgage products and the expansion of alternative lending channels, namely non-agency securitization, fundamentally altered the mortgage landscape during the boom. We describe the impact of these changes in mortgage finance on borrowers and loan performance, as well as their impact on the resolution of distressed mortgages.
This paper considers a model of (irreversible) investment under uncertainty for a firm facing external financing costs. Such a firm prefers to fund its investment through internal funds, so that thefirm's optimal investment policy and value now depend on the size of its retained earnings. We show that the standard real options results are significantly modified when there are external financing costs.
We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties — the Proposer and the Responder — who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the underlying investment and termination risk. When the project ends they consume their final accumulated wealth. The Proposer and the Responder have constant relative risk aversion R and r respectively, with R > r > 0.
We develop a dynamic valuation model of private equity (PE) investments by solving the portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse investor (LP), who invests in a PE fund, managed by a general partner (GP). Key features are illiquidity, leverage, GP value-adding skills (alpha), and compensation, including management fees and carried interest. We find that the costs of management fees, carried interest, and illiquidity are high, and the GP needs to generate substantial value to cover these costs. Leverage substantially reduces these costs.
We develop a liability driven investment framework that incorporates downside risk penalties for not meeting liabilities. The shortfall between the asset and liabilities can be valued as an option which swaps the value of the endogenously determined optimal portfolio for the value of the liabilities. The optimal portfolio selection exhibits endogenous risk aversion and as the funding ratio deviates from the fully funded case in both directions, effective risk aversion decreases.
An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that for moderate outside option values, strategic communication is characterized by pandering: the agent biases his recommendation toward "conditionally better-looking" projects, even when both parties would be better of with some other project. A project that has lower expected value can be conditionally better-looking.