Financial Institutions

In this paper, I use anecdotal evidence and logical reasoning to suggest that, despite the use of an extensive database, it is not possible to conclude that passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act did not have an impact on companies' delisting decisions. Moreover, the instrumental variables used to proxy for SOX effects are too weak and suffer from a significant endogeneity problem given that passage of SOX was driven by many of the economic and control problems that are used to control for market and company factors.

We empirically analyze the illicit trade in cultural property and antiques, taking advantage of different reporting incentives between source and destination countries. We thus generate a measure of illicit trafficking in these goods based on the difference between imports recorded in United States' customs data and the (purportedly identical) trade as recorded by customs authorities in exporting countries.

This chapter considers several important areas of response (or nonresponse) of banking regulation to the crisis. I begin with an overview of the causes of the crisis and the ways in which the crisis has highlighted the need for regulatory reform. I review the prospects for the reform of regulatory content. I also consider and evaluate the potential changes in the structure of regulation and supervision coming out of the crisis.

The heated debate about how to reform Social Security has come to a standstill because the view of most Democrats (that Social Security must be a defined benefits plan similar in spirit to the current system) seems irreconcilable with the proposals supported by many Republicans (to create a defined contribution system of personal accounts holding marketed assets).

The literature on the benefits and costs of financial globalization for developing countries has exploded in recent years, but along many disparate channels with a variety of apparently conflicting results. There is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of broad capital account liberalization, but a number of recent papers in the finance literature report that equity market liberalizations do significantly boost growth.

This paper studies the joint impact of corruption on the entry mode and volume of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) using a unique firm-level data set. We find that corruption not only reduces inward FDI, but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures. The latter finding supports the view that corruption increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. However, R&D intensive firms are found to favor sole ownership.