Financial Institutions

We develop a model of investor information choices and asset prices where the availability of information about fundamentals is time-varying. A competitive research sector produces more information when more investors are willing to pay for that research. This feedback, from investor willingness to pay for information to more information production, generates two regimes in equilibrium, one having high prices and low volatility, the other the opposite. The low-price, high-volatility regime is associated with greater information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.

In this paper, we examine a novel two-stage mechanism for selling government securities, wherein the dealers underwrite in the first stage the sale of securities, which are auctioned in stage 2 via either a discriminatory auction (DA) or a uniform price auction (UPA).

We construct new measures of country risk and sentiment as perceived by global investors and executives using textual analysis of the quarterly earnings calls of publicly listed firms around the world. Our quarterly measures cover 45 countries from 2002-2020. We use our measures to provide a novel characterization of country risk and to provide a harmonized definition of crises. We demonstrate that elevated perceptions of a country's riskiness are associated with significant falls in local asset prices and capital outflows, even after global financial conditions are controlled for.

Shotgun marriage between credit investors and companies to be tested amid recovery from pandemic.

Using a unique setting where stand-alone banks submit filings to bank regulators instead of to the SEC, we examine the consequences of fragmented securities regulation on disclosure compliance and information-processing costs. Consistent with the theory that bank regulators are less concerned about transparency than the SEC is, we find that bank regulators’ disclosure requirements are laxer, and stand-alone banks are more likely to violate filing deadlines.