Financial Institutions

Originators produce higher quality assets at a private cost. These assets can either be bought by informed intermediaries or sold in a pool with low quality assets. Savings gluts diminish origination incentives because they compress the spread between the price paid for high quality assets and the price paid for the pool. The narrowing of the spreads relaxes borrowing constraints, which results in higher leverage. Thus savings gluts generate financial fragility — the sensitivity of financial intermediaries' equity to unforeseen contingencies.

Banks' exposure to large-scale asset purchases, as measured by the relative prevalence of mortgage-backed securities on their books, affects lending following unconventional monetary policy shocks. Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, this paper finds strong effects of the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) on credit. Highly affected commercial banks increase lending by 2 to 3% relative to their counterparts. QE2 had no significant impact, consistent with its exclusive focus on Treasuries sparsely held by banks.

When one thinks hedge fund fees, the phrase “2 and 20” — meaning a 2% management fee and 20% performance fee — usually comes to mind. This wasn't always the case.

Recent bank regulations have imposed large compliance costs on banks of all sizes, and have increased the costs of borrowing to both consumers and companies. But in this summary of his recent book, the author argues that the problems with banking system regulation go well beyond the excessive costs. Indeed, Dodd-Frank and other post-crisis regulatory reforms have failed to address the major shortcomings that produced the crisis of 2007–2009. Most importantly, excessive housing finance risk was not dealt with adequately, and is already on the rise again.