Financial Institutions

What is the next step for institutional investors who have already embraced investing in established large hedge fund managers? What are the benefits of embracing smaller emerging hedge fund managers?

Extant knowledge of Ponzi schemes in the accounting and finance literature is mainly anecdotal. The consequence of this is that it is difficult to know what, if anything, can be done to deter these frauds. We seek to fill part of our knowledge gap about Ponzi schemes by providing large-scale evidence based on a sample of 376 Ponzi schemes prosecuted by the SEC between 1988 and 2012. Our evidence indicates that the majority of SEC-prosecuted schemes involve sums that are much lower than those in the highly visible frauds perpetrated by Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford.

In this paper we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks' financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress?

Six years after the passage of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly known as TARP, it remains hard to measure the total social costs and benefits of the assistance to banks provided under TARP programs. TARP was not a single approach to assisting weak banks but rather a variety of changing solutions to a set of evolving problems. TARP's passage was associated with significant improvements in financial markets and the health of financial intermediaries, as well as an increase in the supply of lending by recipients.

Having invested multiple billion dollars of pension assets, and now teaching "Institutional Investing; Alternatives in Pension Plans," I approach this question with theoretical and empirical knowledge, and more than a modicum of trepidation.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008 using a unique loan-level dataset from a major national mortgage bank. Our analysis highlights two major problems underlying the mortgage crisis: a heavy reliance on mortgage brokers who tend to originate lower quality loans, and a high prevalence of low-documentation loans—known in the industry as "liars' loans"—which results in information falsification by borrowers.