Financial Institutions

The financial crisis that erupted in late 2007 has resurfaced debates about the role of accounting and external financial reporting by financial institutions in helping detect or mask systemic risks and in exacerbating or mitigating such risks. The debate has largely focused on the role of fair value accounting, securitization and special purpose entities, off-balance sheet reporting and pro-cyclicality. We consider these and other issues using a single company's published accounts.

Using data from a major mortgage bank, we examine the predictive power of mortgage delinquency models as an aggregate measure of the quality of information recorded at loan origination. We measure model predictive power using an out-of-sample prediction criterion and compare predictive power of delinquency models over time and across loans of different documentation levels and origination channels.

This paper uses a Pragmatic theory of language (drawn from philosophy and linguistics) to diagnose the causes of excessive financial disclosure and propose a regulatory solution. The diagnosis is that existing disclosure regulations are one sided, effectively encouraging firms to disclose any information that might be relevant, but failing to discourage disclosure of information that adds little to what investors already know.

Defaults arising from illiquidity can lead to private workouts, formal bankruptcy proceedings or even liquidation. All these outcomes can result in deadweight losses. Corporate illiquidity in the presence of realistic capital market frictions can be managed by a) equity dilution, b) carrying positive cash balances, or c) entering into loan commitments with a syndicate of lenders. An efficient way to manage illiquidity is to rely on mechanisms that transfer cash from "good states" into "bad states" (i.e., financial distress) without wasting liquidity in the process.

Leading up to the recent crisis, government encouraged risky lending, and failed to measure banks' risks credibly or to require sufficient capital. Regulators also failed to losses or enforce intervention protocols for timely resolution. This paper proposes radical policy changes to prevent a recurrence. The need is not for more complex rules and more supervisory discretion, but rather for simpler rules that are meaningful in measuring and limiting risk, hard for market participants to circumvent and credibly enforced by supervisors.

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value-destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries.