Managerial Accounting

We study a principal-agent model of moral hazard in which the principal has an abandonment option. The option to abandon a project midstream limits a firm's downside risk. From a consumption (production) perspective, the option is clearly beneficial. However, from an incentive perspective, the option can be costly. Removing the lower tail of the project's underlying cash flow distribution also eliminates the information it contains about an agent's (unobservable) productive input.

In this paper, limited managerial capacity gives rise to a timing option: agents can implement projects now-or-later. Because each agent cares only about the project he implements, while the principal cares about the projects undertaken in aggregate, the timing option may be valued differently by the principal and the agents. Under a fair assignment rule (one that treats the agents symmetrically), these conflicting valuations result in agents sometimes not implementing the principal's desired projects.

We report on a panel discussion at the 2001 CMU Accounting MiniConference under the title "Intellectual Foundations of Accounting." We provide a background and the motivation for the discussion and present the remarks by the four panelists. A number of perspectives are taken. Professor Sunder emphasizes dualities in accounting. Professor Demski stresses the endogeneity of accounting measurement activities. Professor Fellingham examines the core and superstructure of accounting. Professor Ijiri observes the microcosmos in accounting and its philosophical connection.

In this study we investigate the valuation implications of managerial actions undertaken by 57 Internet firms engaged in Business-to-Business (B2B) e-commerce.

A pervasive theme in both accounting and statistics is aggregation. However, in contrast to statistics, a customary standard for determining the best aggregation rule in accounting is unavailable or, at least, not explicitly defined. Also, most accounting procedures follow a well-specified recursive algorithm of updating a summarized history number (a beginning balance sheet number) by the current period's activities (changes).

This paper explores “revenue accounting” in contrast to traditional “cost accounting.” Revenue accounting serves the information needs of managers and investors in planning and controlling a firm’s sales activities and their financial consequences, especially in the age of e-commerce. Weaknesses of traditional accounting have become particularly evident recently, for example, the lack of 1) revenue mileposts, 2) revenue sustainability measurements, and 3) intangibles capitalization.

This research investigates whether oil and gas producing firms use abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives as substitutes to manage earnings volatility. Firms engaged in oil exploration and drilling are exposed to two kinds of risks that can cause earnings volatility: oil price risk and exploration risk. Firms can use abnormal accrual choices and/or derivatives to reduce earnings volatility caused by oil price risk, but cannot directly hedge the operational risk of unsuccessful drilling.

This paper studies how to assign monitors to productive agents in order to generate signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective. We show that if signals generated by the same monitor are negatively (positively) correlated, then the optimal monitoring assignment will be focused (dispersed). This holds because dispersed monitoring allows the firm to better utilize relative performance evaluation.

This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal-agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assumptions about the outcome set frequently made in the principal-agent literature.