Managerial Accounting

Arya, Glover, and Sunder (AGS) contribute to the earnings management literature along two dimenstion. First, they classify existing explanations for earnings manipulation, based on the assumption of the revelation principle that is violated. Second, they introduce a model where allowing a manager to manipulate earnings serves as a commitment device. They show that both the owners and the manager can benefit from earnings management (a Pareto improvement). My discussion first deals with the general phenomenon of earnings management and then with the specifics of the AGS model.

This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal.

This note considers a principal–multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes–Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining the desired equilibrium).

In this study we consider managerial earnings forecasts as voluntary information releases and compare their properties with predictions from a screening or signaling scenario.

This paper compares the properties of dividend announcements and management earnings forecasts as predictors of earnings and firm value. First, the two predictors are compared on the basis of their ability to predict earnings. Then the information they convey about firm value is assessed by comparison of the performance of investment strategies based on values of the two predictors. Finally, the effects of dividend announcements on stock prices are considered.

Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually invest in firms that have stakeholder-friendly track records. Using a comprehensive sample of self-labelled ESG mutual funds (as identified by Morningstar) in the United States from 2010 to 2018, we find that these funds hold portfolio firms with worse track records for compliance with labor and environmental laws, relative to portfolio firms held by non-ESG funds managed by the same financial institutions in the same years.

We study optimal workforce and contract design for a firm that employs a team of two agents. The agents have possibly diverse demographic characteristics captured by their discount factors. We also study optimal team design for four agents with given discount factors—two with low discount factors and two with high discount factors—who are to be assigned to two teams and identify conditions under which diverse assignment is optimal.