Marketplace Design

Rupert Murdoch and Sumner Redstone are so smart, why are their stocks long-term losers?

Managing shipping vessel profitability is a central problem in marine transportation. We consider two commonly used types of vessels—liners (ships whose routes are fixed in advance) and trampers (ships for which future route components are selected based on available shipping jobs)—and formulate a vessel profit maximization problem as a stochastic dynamic program. For liner vessels, the profit maximization reduces to the problem of minimizing refueling costs over a given route subject to random fuel prices and limited vessel fuel capacity.

We study the product design problem of a revenue-maximizing firm that serves a market where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their valuations and desire for a quality attribute and are characterized by a perhaps novel model of customer choice behavior. Specifically, instead of optimizing the net utility that results from an appropriate combination of prices and quality levels, customers are "satisficers" in that they seek to buy the cheapest product with quality above a certain customer-specific threshold.

We describe research on a supply chain contracting problem that was sponsored by a major semi-conductor manufacturer. The manufacturer sells products (semi-conductor parts) with varying quality levels through a network of distributors to end consumers (independent computer shops, system configurators, hobbyists, etc.) who have heterogeneous valuations for quality. Since production costs for semi-conductors are essentially independent of quality levels (within a part family), the manufacturer earns much more selling higher quality parts.

This paper considers a profit-maximizing make-to-order manufacturer that offers multiple products to a market of price and delay sensitive users, using a model that captures three aspects of particular interest: first, the joint use of dynamic pricing and lead-time quotation controls to manage demand; second, the presence of a dual sourcing mode that can expedite orders at a cost; and third, the interaction of the aforementioned demand controls with the operational decisions of sequencing and expediting that the firm must employ to optimize revenues and satisfy the quoted lead times.

This paper compares centralized and decentralized price setting by a firm that sells a single product in two markets, but is constrained to set one price (e.g., due to arbitrage). Each market is characterized by a different linear demand function, and demand conditions are privately observed by a local manager. This manager only cares about profits in his own market and, as a result, communicates his information strategically. Our main results link organizational design to market demand.

We develop a structural demand model that captures the effect of out-of-stocks on customer choice. Our estimation method uses store-level data on sales and partial information on product availability. Our model allows for flexible substitution patterns which are based on utility maximization principles and can accommodate categorical and continuous product characteristics. The methodology can be applied to data from multiple markets and in categories with a relatively large number of alternatives, slow moving products and frequent out-of-stocks.

This special issue of Production and Operations Management offers a sample of ongoing research that focuses currently on the services industries. The articles selected cover a spectrum of application areas as well as methodologies.

We model the commercial World Wide Web as a directed graph that emerges as the equilibrium of a game in which utility maximizing websites purchase (advertising) in-links from each other while also setting the price of these links. In equilibrium, higher content sites tend to purchase more advertising links (mirroring the Dorfman-Steiner rule) while selling less advertising links themselves.