Organizations & Markets

Originally published in 1992 this book charts the global restructuring of telecommunications industries away from the monopoly structures of the past towards increased competition, deregulation and privatization. The book's authors are international policy-makers and scholars, who examine the regulatory environment within a theoretical and historical context. The book looks at the roots of regulatory and legislative changes by discussing individually the countries at the forefront of the revolution: the UK, France, Germany, Japan and the United States.

In the United States, the Golden Age of the public network, in which substantial universal service coincided with group substantial monopoly, was as brief and romanticized as the cowboy era; it lasted about twenty years from 1950, but in the mid-1960s centrifugal forces began their assault. The departure from the public school system cannot be explained primarily by the supply of new options or by new technology but rather by an increased demand to exit. In a similar sense, recent centrifugal development in independent electric power generation had very little to do with new technology.

How do different bankruptcy approaches affect the local economy? Using U.S. Census microdata, we explore the spillover effects of reorganization and liquidation on geographically proximate firms. We exploit the random assignment of bankruptcy judges as a source of exogenous variation in the probability of liquidation. We find that employment declines substantially in the immediate neighborhood of the liquidated establishments, relative to reorganized establishments.

This paper assesses cross-country variation in life-cycle human capital accumulation, using new evidence from US immigrants. The returns to experience accumulated in an immigrant's birth country before migrating are positively correlated with birth-country GDP per capita. To understand this fact, we build a model of life-cycle human capital accumulation that features three potential theories: differential human capital accumulation, differential selection, and differential skill loss.

I find that shadow bank money creation significantly expands during monetary tightening. This "shadow money channel" offsets the reductions in commercial bank deposits and dampens the impact of monetary policy. Using a structural model of bank competition, I show that heterogeneous depositor clientele quantitatively explains the difference in monetary transmission between commercial and shadow banks. Facing more yield-sensitive clientele, shadow banks pass through more rate hikes to depositors, thereby attract more deposits when the Fed raises rates.

Prior research has found inconsistent effects of diversity on group performance. The present research identifies hormonal factors as a critical moderator of the diversity-performance connection. Integrating the diversity, status, and hormone literatures, we predicted that groups collectively low in testosterone, which orients individuals less toward status competitions and more toward cooperation, would excel with greater group diversity. In contrast, groups collectively high in testosterone, which is associated with a heightened status drive, would be derailed by diversity.

Geographic price discrimination is generally considered beneficial to firm profitability. Firms can extract higher rents by varying prices across markets to match consumers' preferences. This paper empirically demonstrates, however, that a firm may instead prefer a national pricing policy that fixes prices across geographic markets, foregoing the opportunity to customize prices. Under appropriate conditions, a national pricing policy helps avoid intense local competition due to targeted prices.

We examine the cost-effectiveness, from the shareholders' perspective, of the accounting standards issued by the FASB during 1973-2009. We evaluate (i) the stock market reactions of firms affected by the standards surrounding events that changed the standard's probability of issuance; and (ii) whether the market reactions are related, in the cross-section, to agency problems, information asymmetry, proprietary costs, contracting costs, and changes in estimation risk.

Value stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks on average, but a “value” position can turn against the investor. Fundamental analysis can explain this so-called value trap: The investor may be buying earnings growth that is risky. Both the earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and the book-to-price ratio (B/P) come into play. E/P indicates expected earnings growth, but price in that ratio also discounts for the risk to that growth; B/P indicates that risk. A striking finding emerges: For a given E/P, a high B/P (“value”) indicates higher expected earnings growth--but growth that is risky.