Organizations & Markets

Originators produce higher quality assets at a private cost. These assets can either be bought by informed intermediaries or sold in a pool with low quality assets. Savings gluts diminish origination incentives because they compress the spread between the price paid for high quality assets and the price paid for the pool. The narrowing of the spreads relaxes borrowing constraints, which results in higher leverage. Thus savings gluts generate financial fragility — the sensitivity of financial intermediaries' equity to unforeseen contingencies.

This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, factional arrangements within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the governing political party of the People's Republic of China. Our empirical analysis ranges from the end of the Deng Xiaoping era to the current Xi Jinping presidency and it covers the appointments of both national and provincial officials using detailed biographical information.

We examine the Internet’s impact on the cross-border distribution of cultural goods and assess its implications for cultural policy and cultural diversity. We present a stylized model of a two-country economy where governments are endowed with political preferences over the consumption of domestic content and enact import barriers and subsidies to protect it. We introduce peer-to-peer file sharing as a distinct distribution channel enabled by the Internet that provides access to all media products at a low cost. We report two main findings.

Exploiting variation in the timing of resets of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), we find that a sizable decline in mortgage payments (up to 50%) induces a significant increase in car purchases (up to 35%). This effect is attenuated by voluntary deleveraging. Borrowers with lower incomes and housing wealth have significantly higher marginal propensity to consume. Areas with a larger share of ARMs were more responsive to lower interest rates and saw a relative decline in defaults and an increase in house prices, car purchases, and employment.

The article shows that outside ownership of media moves in stages -- from media properties as the mouthpiece for personal and business interests, to a second stage of conglomerates seeking economic “synergies” of performance, to a third stage dominated by financial portfolio diversification. These phases of outside media ownership correspond to the stages of economic development in that country.The article finds that in rich countries, the ownership of media by industrial companies as a way to create political influence has been declining.

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist's target.

This paper shows that local economic shocks spill over to distant regions through firms' internal networks, and that such spillovers matter economically by affecting aggregate employment in those regions. Using confidential micro data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that establishment-level employment responds strongly to shocks in other regions in which the firm is operating. Consistent with theory, the elasticity of establishment-level employment with respect to shocks in other regions increases with firms' financial constraints.

Past research paints a mixed picture of rationales in negotiations: Some findings suggest rationales might help, whereas others suggest they may have little effect or backfire. Here, we distinguish between two kinds of rationales buyers commonly employ — constraint rationales (referring to one's own limited resources) and disparagement rationales (involving critiques of the negotiated object) — and demonstrate their divergent effects.

We study how much communication is needed to find a stable matching in a two-sided matching market with private preferences. Segal (2007) and Gonczarowski et al. (2015) showed that, in the worst case, any protocol that computes a stable matching requires the communication cost per agent to scale linearly with the total number of agents. In markets with many thousands of agents, this communication requirement is implausibly high, casting doubt on whether stable matchings can arise in large markets.