Economics Insights @ CBS

On search keywords with trademarked terms, the brand owner ("focal brand") and other relevant firms compete for consumers. For the focal brand, paid clicks have a direct substitute in the organic links below the paid ad(s). The proximity of this substitute depends on whether competing firms are bidding aggressively to siphon off traffic. We study the returns to focal brands and competitors using large-scale experiments on Bing with data from thousands of brands.

We present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital. We find that they make their contracts depend on public information, e.g., credit ratings or benchmark indices, as a way to attract flows, rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems, as has been emphasized in the literature. Unfortunately, asset managers' competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom: asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient.

Our theory explains how multi-product corporations that engage in customer-centric diversification can create and sustain corporate advantage. First, we invoke the concept of customer-centric assets to explain their role as the cornerstone of corporate advantage in customer-centric diversification. Second, our explanation of the corporate advantage in customer-centric diversification goes beyond the hypothetical "consumer synergies" argument to also include the "market-power advantage" argument.

We examine the cost-effectiveness, from the shareholders' perspective, of the accounting standards issued by the FASB during 1973-2009. We evaluate (i) the stock market reactions of firms affected by the standards surrounding events that changed the standard's probability of issuance; and (ii) whether the market reactions are related, in the cross-section, to agency problems, information asymmetry, proprietary costs, contracting costs, and changes in estimation risk.

A recent development in online advertising has been the ability of advertisers to have their ads displayed exclusively on (a part of) a web page. We study this phenomenon in the context of both sponsored search advertising and display advertising. Ads are sold through auctions, and when exclusivity is allowed, the seller accepts two bids from advertisers, where one bid is for the standard display format in which multiple advertisers are displayed, and the other bid is for being shown exclusively (therefore they are called two-dimensional, or 2D, auctions).