Economics Insights @ CBS

In a number of service systems, there can be substantial latitude to vary service rates. However, although speeding up service rate during periods of congestion may address a present congestion issue, it may actually exacerbate the problem by increasing the need for rework. We introduce a state-dependent queuing network where service times and return probabilities depend on the “overloaded” and “underloaded” state of the system.

This paper examines how organizations use employee networks to contend with job seekers' search behavior. According to prior research, in markets where job seekers engage in nonsequential job search, organizations respond with tactics such as exploding offers and recruiting candidates earlier. In this paper, I posit that organizations have a social structural response. I argue that in an attempt to avoid problems related to candidates' job search, organizations are more likely to provide job offers to candidates with friends in the hiring organization than to those without friends.

Friendly gestures (e.g., smiles, flattery, favors) typically build trust and earn good will. However, we propose that people feel unsettled when enemies initiate friendly gestures. To resolve these sensemaking difficulties, people find order through superstitious reasoning about friendly enemies. Supporting this theorizing, friendly enemies created sensemaking difficulty, which in turn mediated people's tendencies to blame them for coincidental negative outcomes (Experiment 1).

We structurally estimate a model in which agents' information processing biases can cause predictability in firms' asset returns and investment inefficiencies. We generalize the neoclassical investment model by allowing for two biases — overconfidence and over-extrapolation of trends — that distort agents' expectations of firm productivity. Our model's predictions closely match empirical data on asset pricing and firm behavior. The estimated bias parameters are well-identified and exhibit plausible magnitudes.

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted.