Economics Insights @ CBS

One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agent's report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agent's communication can be valuable.

This study examines whether the quality of online buying experience represents a competitive advantage for Internet firms focused on business to consumer e-commerce (“e-commerce” firms). Forrester Research, a consulting firm, estimates that revenues in the business to consumer segment will grow from $20 billion in 1999 to $184 billion by 2004. Such explosive growth is due, in part, to the superior shopping experiences that new e-commerce firms offer.

This paper analyzes the role of jumps in continuous-time short rate models. I first develop a test to detect jump-induced misspecification and, using Treasury bill rates, find evidence for the presence of jumps. Second, I specify and estimate a nonparametric jump-diffusion model. Results indicate that jumps play an important statistical role. Estimates of jump times and sizes indicate that unexpected news about the macroeconomy generates the jumps. Finally, I investigate the pricing implications of jumps.