Economics Insights @ CBS

This note considers a principal–multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes–Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining the desired equilibrium).

This paper examines time-series properties of exchange rate changes, the forward premium and the forward bias in the context of a variant of Svensson's cash-in-advance model. The model is solved and simulated using realistic forcing processes whose law of motion is estimated from U.S.-Japan data and then approximated by a Markov chain. Although method of moments estimation shows that the over-identifying restrictions implied by the model are not rejected, it fails dramatically in producing a sufficiently variable risk premium on forward market speculation.

We show that valuing performance is equivalent to valuing a particular contingent claim on an index portfolio. In general the form of the contingent claim is not known and must be estimated. We suggest approximating the contingent claim by a series of options. We illustrate the use of our method by evaluating the performance of 130 mutual funds during the period 1968-82. We find that the relative performance rank of a fund is rather insensitive to the choice of the index, even though the actual value of the services of the portfolio manager depends on the choice of the index.