Research Lab

This paper provides evidence of the real effects of financial markets. Using mutual fund redemptions as an instrument for price changes, we identify a strong effect of market prices on takeover activity (the "trigger effect"). An inter-quartile decrease in valuation leads to a 7 percentage point increase in acquisition likelihood, relative to a 6% unconditional takeover probability. Instrumentation addresses the fact that prices are endogenous and increase in anticipation of a takeover (the "anticipation effect").

This paper compares accounting and finance approaches to equity valuation, with a focus on practical investing. It shows how the two endeavors tie to the same theoretical foundation so they have the potential of being unified. Finance has largely focused on the "denominator" aspect of valuation— the discount rate—under the mantra of "asset pricing" while accounting has largely focused on the numerator; specifying the expected accounting outcomes to be discounted. The paper shows how both accounting and finance can be unified to resolve both the numerator and denominator issue in valuation.

Standard principal-agent models commonly invoked to explain executive pay practices do not account for the involvement of third-party intermediaries in the CEO labor market. This paper investigates the influence of one such intermediary — talent agents who seek out prospective employers and negotiate pay packages on behalf of CEOs. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) characterize the hiring of such agents as an obvious example of rent extraction by incoming CEOs.

This paper discusses some existing and potential roles of financial reporting disclosures. The focus is on what are conventionally termed mandatory disclosures, although as Sunder (1997) points out the distinction between mandatory and voluntary is somewhat arbitrary. The paper views disclosure through the lens of incentives. Accounting disclosures are a component of the broad set of information shareholders, debt holders, and other accountees have to assess the stewardship of accountors.

Defaults arising from illiquidity can lead to private workouts, formal bankruptcy proceedings or even liquidation. All these outcomes can result in deadweight losses. Corporate illiquidity in the presence of realistic capital market frictions can be managed by a) equity dilution, b) carrying positive cash balances, or c) entering into loan commitments with a syndicate of lenders. An efficient way to manage illiquidity is to rely on mechanisms that transfer cash from "good states" into "bad states" (i.e., financial distress) without wasting liquidity in the process.

Leading up to the recent crisis, government encouraged risky lending, and failed to measure banks' risks credibly or to require sufficient capital. Regulators also failed to losses or enforce intervention protocols for timely resolution. This paper proposes radical policy changes to prevent a recurrence. The need is not for more complex rules and more supervisory discretion, but rather for simpler rules that are meaningful in measuring and limiting risk, hard for market participants to circumvent and credibly enforced by supervisors.

A growing literature suggests that even in the absence of any ability to predict returns, holding options on the benchmarks or trading frequently can generate positive alpha. The ratio of alpha to its tracking error appraises a fund's performance. This paper derives the performance-maximizing strategy, which turns out to be a variant of a buy-write strategy, and the least upper bound on such performance enhancement. If common equity indices are used as benchmarks, the potential alpha generated from trading frequently can be substantial in magnitude, but it carries considerable risk.

What discount rate should the government use to measure the financial status of various government programs and the impact of potential policy changes? How, if at all, should the discount rate take into account the risk of the underlying cash flows? We examine these questions in the context of one of the largest components of the U.S. budget: Social Security. Official measures of the U.S. Social Security system's present value funding shortfall are computed using the risk-free interest rate.

Contingent capital, a regulatory debt that must convert into common equity when a bank's equity value falls below a specified threshold (a trigger), does not in general lead to a unique equilibrium in the prices of the bank's equity and contingent capital. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium arises because economic agents are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interests. The lack of unique equilibrium introduces the potential for price manipulation, market uncertainty, inefficient capital allocation, and unreliability of conversion.