Research Lab

I investigate the relationship between liquidity and market efficiency using data from short-horizon binary outcome securities listed on the TradeSports exchange. I find that liquidity does not reduce—and sometimes increases—deviations of prices from financial and sporting event outcomes. One explanation is that limit order traders are naïve about other traders' knowledge and unwittingly bet against them, which can slow the response of prices to information.

A German broker's clients place similar speculative trades and therefore tend to be on the same side of the market in a given stock during a given day, week, month, and quarter. Aggregate liquidity effects, short sale constraints, the systematic execution of limit orders (coordinated through price movements) or the correlated trading of other investors who pick off retail limit orders, do not fully explain why retail investors trade similarly. Correlated market orders lead returns, presumably due to persistent speculative price pressure.

We are currently experiencing a major shock to the financial system, initiated by problems in the subprime mortgage market, which spread to securitization products and credit markets more generally. Banks are being asked to increase the amount of risk that they absorb (by moving off-balance sheet assets onto their balance sheets), but losses that the banks have suffered limit their capacity to absorb those risky assets.

This paper empirically investigates directors' ownership in the mutual fund industry. Our results show that, contrary to anecdotal evidence, a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds they oversee. Ownership patterns are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. That is, ownership is positively and significantly correlated with most variables that are predicted to indicate greater value from directors' monitoring. For example, directors' ownership is more prevalent in actively managed funds and in funds with lower institutional ownership.

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk.

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premia, and higher interest rate.

Under U.S. GAAP, reported balance sheet and income statements are based on immediate expensing of R&D expenditures. We capitalize those expenditures and derive adjusted equity book values and earnings using simple amortization techniques (straight-line over assumed industry-specific useful lives). After confirming that such adjustments increase the association of book values/earnings with contemporaneous stock prices (and future earnings), we examine the relation between those adjustments and future returns.

In this paper, we discuss earnings quality and the related concept of earnings management, focusing on the primary financial accounts. For each key line-item from the financial statements, we summarize accounting and economic considerations applicable to that item, discuss implications for earnings quality, evaluate the susceptibility of the item to manipulation, and identify potential red flags. The red flags and specific issues discussed for the individual line-items provide a framework for fundamental and contextual analysis by academic researchers and practitioners.

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism.