Corporate Finance

ASC 842, which requires balance sheet recognition of right-of-use (ROU) lease assets, resulted in a large increase in reported assets since 2019, thus impairing the time-series consistency of metrics that use assets (e.g., asset turnover). This paper shows that ROU assets can be estimated quite precisely using lease disclosure. Adding the estimated ROU asset for pre-ASC 842 observations substantially improves the ability of operating assets to explain sales. It also increases the ability of growth in operating assets to predict sales growth and explain analysts’ revenue growth forecasts.

There is a consensus that global value chains have aided developing countries' growth. This essay highlights the governance complexities arising from participating in such chains, drawing from lessons we have learned conducting research in the coffee and garment supply chains. Market power of international buyers can lead to inefficiently low wages, prices, quality standards, and poor working conditions. At the same time, some degree of market power might be needed to sustain long-term supply relationships that are beneficial in a world with incomplete contracts.

How can we measure the extent to which data-intensive firms are using their market power? Economists typically look to markups as evidence of market power. Using a simple model with firms that price risk in their capital allocation and production decisions, we highlight the competing forces that make markups an unreliable measure of data-derived market power. Instead, we show how markups measured at different levels of aggregation reflect data and distinguish data from other intangible investments.

We identify model-free mispricing factors and relate them to global stock prices and investor beliefs. The factors are model-free as they measure variation in the relative prices of assets with the same cash ows. We design three factors to re ect the beliefs and capital ows of important clientele: investors in United States (US), developed, and emerging stock markets; and individuals and institutions. Together the three factors capture most (52%) of the systematic variation in price premiums of individual securities.

Banks strategically choose and dynamically restructure deposits and nondeposit debt in response to the minimum requirements on total capital and tangible equity. We derive the optimal strategic liability structure and show that it minimizes the protection for deposits conditional on capital requirements. Although, given any liability structure, regulators can set capital requirements high enough to remove the incentive for risk substitution, the strategic response to the capital requirements always preserves this incentive.

Equity investors have been shifting away from actively managed funds to passive strategies for decades. Passification, if that is a word, has been slower to take off in fixed-income strategies, though.

High returns for investors. Our author argues that a different approach to ESG can strike a better balance between environmental and social goals and profits.

Despite regulators’ allegations that digital technology giants misuse their market power to earn abnormal profits, there is a dearth of systematic work on (i) whether digital-tech firms in general, and tech giants in particular, earn excess profits; or (ii) whether their abnormal profitability, if any, is due to market power.